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I. INTRODUCTION
Bridging international and constitutional law scholarship,
I examine the question of torture in light of democratic val-
ues.  The focus in this Article is on the international prohibi-
tion on torture as this norm was addressed through the politi-
cal process in the aftermath of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.1  Respond-
ing to charges that the international torture prohibition—and
international law generally—poses irreconcilable challenges
1. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (holding that the President lacked authority
to establish the military commission to try Hamdan and that the commission
violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions).
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for democracy and our constitutional framework, I contend
that by promoting respect for fundamental rights and for mi-
norities and outsiders, international law actually facilitates a
broad conception of democracy and constitutionalism.  I take
on the question of torture within the context of the broader
debate over the relationship between internationalism and
constitutionalism.  In doing so, I demonstrate how we can un-
derstand varying positions taken in this debate as reflecting
different perspectives on the meaning of democracy.
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, critics of
domestic incorporation of international law have made two
central arguments about the role of the democratic process in
negotiating the relationship between international law and
our Constitution.  In one arena—federal courts—these critics
have argued for greater democratic process before courts can
be permitted to resort to international and comparative law in
interpreting the Constitution.  They argue that without greater
democratic deliberation, reliance on international law—even
binding ratified treaties—is not true to our constitutional ide-
als of democratic accountability, self-governance, and popular
sovereignty.
In another arena—the executive branch—some of the
same critics have argued for less democratic process in the
treatment of international law in President George W. Bush’s
“War on Terror.”2  A weak version of this claim is that the Pres-
ident should have maximum flexibility in interpreting legisla-
tion implementing treaty obligations requiring humane treat-
ment of people detained in the War on Terror.3  The stronger
2. I use the phrase “War on Terror” because it is the rubric under which
the Bush Administration’s policies in the aftermath of the September 11 ter-
rorist attacks are commonly known.  However, since the term implies indefi-
nite elasticity—for example, in its geographic and temporal scope—I use the
term advisedly.  For a cogent analysis of what the War on Terror is (or
should be), see PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT:  THE WARS FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (forthcoming 2008) (containing a Part entitled
“Does the Idea of a War on Terror Make Sense?”).
3. For a helpful collection of essays representing different perspectives
on presidential power and the U.S. War on Terror, see Symposium, War,
Terrorism and Torture:  Limits on Presidential Power in the 21st Century, 81 IND.
L.J. 1139 (2006), and also see Daphne Barak-Erez, Terrorism Law Between
the Executive Model and the Legislative Model 11 (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author). Compare Martin S. Flaherty, More Real than Apparent:
Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law, and Comparative Executive “Creativity” in
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version of this claim is that application of international law
constraints—even treaties that are not only ratified but imple-
mented into legislation by both houses of Congress—would un-
constitutionally encroach on the President’s power to wage
war as Commander-in-Chief.4  With the revelation of abusive
treatment of detainees at the Abu Ghraib detention facility in
Iraq, as well as allegations of abuse at facilities in Afghanistan,
Guantanamo, and at secret prisons elsewhere, these calls for
executive unilateralism warrant close examination.
Critics’ arguments in these two arenas turn on fundamen-
tal separation of powers questions raised by domestic incorpo-
ration of international law.  In a sense, these two positions re-
late to two separate issues and so are not inherently contradic-
tory.  In the War on Terror context, the issue is the scope of
the Commander-in-Chief power.  In the constitutional inter-
pretation context, the issue is what constitutes law under the
Constitution.  However, as I will demonstrate, the two claims
turn on different conceptions about the requirements and
meaning of democracy.
Thus, in analyzing these claims, I ask why critics are quick
to challenge international law as lacking a democratic founda-
tion even as they are eager to dismiss the democratic legiti-
macy bestowed by Congressional sharing of war power.
Viewed side by side, the two positions regarding the role of the
democratic process are in tension.  If, at the end of the day,
the President can simply ignore international and even domes-
tic law when he deems it necessary, the democracy question is
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 51, 51 (Mark K.
Moller ed., 2005–2006), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/scr/2006/
flaherty.pdf [hereinafter Flaherty, More Real than Apparent] (agreeing with
the Hamdan Court’s embrace of separation of powers limits on the Presi-
dent) with John Yoo, An Imperial Judiciary at War: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, in
id., at 83, 83, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/scr/2006/yoo.pdf (as-
serting that “the Hamdan decision ignores the basic workings of the Ameri-
can separation of powers and will hamper the ability of future presidents to
respond to emergencies and war with the forcefulness and vision of a Lin-
coln or an FDR”).
4. Of course, even without implementing legislation, ratified treaties
have a democratic imprimatur insofar as the President has the “power, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided
two thirds of the Senators present concur[.]” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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beside the point.  Is the “democratic deficit” critique5 in the
context of constitutional interpretation simply opportunistic,
given this disregard for democratic participation in the con-
text of presidential power?
The critics justify the distinction between these two de-
mocracy-related positions by claiming that “war is different”
and the President’s role in war is unique.  War justifies, in fact
demands, less democratic deliberation, they say.  We need a
single decisionmaker—the President—to act with dispatch
and secrecy in such a circumstance.  Moreover, they argue, the
War on Terror is like no other war.  As such, one former se-
nior Bush Administration official derided the Geneva Conven-
tions6—the body of international humanitarian law that
emerged in 1949 in the aftermath of World War II—as
“quaint” and “obsolete” in the face of this “new kind of war.”7
5. The “democratic deficit” criticism has been transplanted to the U.S.
context from the European Union.  For a discussion of the democratic defi-
cit criticism in the European context, see for example Andrew Moravcsik, In
Defense of the “Democratic Deficit”:  Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union,
40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 603 (2002); Thomas W. Pogge, Creating Supra-
National Institutions Democratically:  Reflections on the European Union’s “Demo-
cratic Deficit,” 5 J. POL. PHIL. 163 (1997); J.H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION
OF EUROPE:  “DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR?” AND OTHER ESSAYS
ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 77-86, 349-56 (1999).  For a discussion of how
this criticism has been transposed into the U.S. context, see for example
Martin S. Flaherty, Judicial Globalization in the Service of Self-Government, 20
ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 477, 478 (2006) [hereinafter Flaherty, Judicial Globaliza-
tion].
6. Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; Geneva Con-
vention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva Conven-
tion (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Ge-
neva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth
Geneva Convention].  For convenience, text references to the Geneva Con-
vention refer to the Third Geneva Convention unless otherwise specified.
Note also that Common Articles are present in all four Geneva Conventions.
Again for convenience, I cite them to the Third Convention.
7. Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President,
to President George W. Bush, on Decision Regarding Application of the Ge-
neva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the
Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS:  THE ROAD TO ABU
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Hamdan v. Rumsfeld firmly rejects the President’s broad as-
sertion of executive unilateralism in the context of military
commissions used to try suspects in the War on Terror.  As
Jack Balkin notes, Hamdan is a “democracy-forcing” decision.8
In rejecting the expansive executive unilateralism advanced by
the Bush Administration, the Court called on the President to
consult with Congress in revising the rules concerning detain-
ees.  At the same time, the decision affirms the relevance and
applicability of international law already implemented into
U.S. law and the use of the democratic process for negotiating
the relationship between international and domestic law.
Because Hamdan affirms the value of democratic delibera-
tion, particularly in cases where the President tries unilaterally
to undo Congress’s work, this Article takes seriously the demo-
cratic deliberation objection that critics of domestic incorpora-
tion of international law selectively make.  In taking this cri-
tique seriously and applying it more consistently to the War on
Terror, the Article demands that these critics likewise apply a
more consistent conception of democracy.  Essentially, then,
GHRAIB 118, 119 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) [herein-
after THE TORTURE PAPERS] (“In my judgment, this new paradigm renders
obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and
renders quaint some of its provisions requiring that captured enemy be af-
forded such things as commissary privileges, scrip (i.e. advances of monthly
pay), athletic uniforms, and scientific instruments.”).
8. Posting of Jack Balkin, Hamdan as a Democracy-Forcing Decision, to
Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/06/hamdan-as-democracy-
forcing-decision.html (June 29, 2006); see also Neal Katyal, Equality in the War
on Terror, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1383 (2007) (describing the Hamdan
Court’s decision to in effect “remand” the decision to Congress as  “delibera-
tion forcing”); Mark Tushnet, The Political Constitution of Emergency Powers:
Some Lessons from Hamdan, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1451 (2007).  Tushnet notes
that:
Hamdan’s rhetoric reinforced its assertion of the centrality of the
courts in the constitutional order.  And yet, Hamdan may be more
important for what it says about the political aspects of the constitu-
tional order . . . .  [A]fter the decision, unlike the situation before
it, the President had to obtain congressional authorization for the
creation of military tribunals that departed from the requirements
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and, perhaps, Common Ar-
ticle 3.
Id. at 1451, 1453.
\\server05\productn\N\NYI\40-3\NYI302.txt unknown Seq: 7 28-MAY-08 11:20
2008] TINKERING WITH TORTURE IN THE AFTERMATH OF HAMDAN 729
the Article makes a “jujutsu move” on the critics.9  It responds
to their challenge on its own terms, analyzing the question of
torture in light of democratic values and revealing how differ-
ent positions on the question of torture itself also result from
different understandings of the requirements of democracy.
Following this Introduction, Part II introduces the
broader challenge for the Article, namely the presumed ten-
sions inherent in the relationship between internationalism
and constitutionalism, and places this relationship in the con-
text of the torture debate.  In fact, as the Article later demon-
strates, the prohibition against torture has been thoroughly
“domesticated,”10 both through the democratic process via its
incorporation into legislation11 and through judicial interpre-
tation, for example in the context of Alien Tort Claims Act
litigation.12  These steps taken—whether legislatively or judi-
cially—to domesticate the torture prohibition represent im-
portant “democracy moments.”13
In analyzing how different conceptions of democracy lead
to different positions on the question of torture, Part III calls
9. The Japanese martial art form, jujutsu, developed around the princi-
ple of using an attacker’s energy against him rather than directly opposing
it.  I would like to thank Kathleen Sullivan for this analogy.
10. I borrow the term  “domesticated” from John McGinnis and Ilya
Somin, who distinguish between  “raw international law,” which “has not
been endorsed by the domestic political process,” and “domesticated inter-
national law,” which has been “expressly made law through the legislative
process”  John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of
Our Law?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (2007).  However, for reasons dis-
cussed in Part IV.A.3, I disagree with their criticism of so-called “raw interna-
tional law.”
11. See, e.g., Federal Torture Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2006); War
Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006).
12. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
13. This claim draws inspiration from Bruce Ackerman’s notion of “con-
stitutional moments.” See generally 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS (1991); Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional
Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 489 (1989).  Expressed as it is in positive law—at both
the international and domestic levels—the prohibition against torture satis-
fies what Gerald Neuman has called “dual positivization.”  Gerald L.
Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional Rights:  Harmony and Dissonance, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1863, 1864 (2003); see also Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive
Law:  Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1747 (2005)
(“Without this convergence [of international and domestic enactment] . . .
the provisions of international law would be even more like the meaningless
verbal flatulence their denigrators often accuse them of being.”).
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for a broader conception of democracy than that espoused by
critics of international law.  In fact, a strictly majoritarian con-
ception of democracy14 might justify the President, as the peo-
ple’s primary elected representative, holding the power to uni-
laterally disregard international restrictions in the course of
the War on Terror.  However, a more robust vision of democ-
racy—that is, a constitutional conception of democracy15—rec-
ognizes that courts, court access, and judicial oversight per-
form important democratic functions in the interpretation of
international law by providing an avenue for those under-
represented in the electoral political process.  Recent efforts to
eliminate the right of habeas corpus and other forms of judi-
cial relief restrict the vital democratic role courts play in offer-
ing such individuals a means to vindicate their basic human
rights under international as well as domestic law.
In Part IV, I explore in greater detail the two democracy-
related claims made by critics of domestic incorporation of in-
ternational law.  These critics embrace the democratic process
as the litmus test for legal legitimacy in the context of constitu-
tional interpretation, even as they assault Congress’s role in
the democratic process as an infringement of presidential
powers in the context of the War on Terror.  While examining
their claims in each area, I explain how we can understand the
divergent positions as reflecting different perspectives on the
requirements of democracy.
Part V examines whether the political response to
Hamdan—the Military Commissions Act of 200616—comports
with the requirements of democracy.  Among other things, the
Military Commissions Act eliminates habeas access for detain-
ees to challenge torture and other abusive treatment.  In fail-
ing to recognize the democratic function of the judiciary, I ar-
gue that the Military Commissions Act does not meet the re-
quirements of the broader constitutional conception of
democracy that this Article supports.  By more fully protecting
14. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW:  THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 15-20 (1996).  As described in greater detail in Part
II, Dworkin distinguishes between two different conceptions of democracy:
a majoritarian conception and a constitutional conception.
15. Id. at 17-19.
16. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-950w and other sections of titles 10, 18, 28,
and 42).
\\server05\productn\N\NYI\40-3\NYI302.txt unknown Seq: 9 28-MAY-08 11:20
2008] TINKERING WITH TORTURE IN THE AFTERMATH OF HAMDAN 731
and representing all the people, a constitutional conception
allowing court access to vindicate fundamental rights may ulti-
mately serve a more fully representative view of democracy,
particularly where rights violations target minorities and out-
siders.17
My focus on the relationship between international law
and the Constitution is timely since “one of the most pressing
questions of contemporary constitutional law is how to think
about the relationship between the national constitution and
international law.”18  In resorting to intradisciplinarity, that is,
analysis across two legal subdisciplines,19 this Article seeks to
explore the value and challenges posed by divergence and
convergence between international and constitutional law.
While the prohibition on torture is a fundamental right in
both international and constitutional law, the challenge re-
mains of upholding two separate though overlapping sys-
tems—(international) human rights and (national) constitu-
tional rights—for the protection of such fundamental rights.
Since “[b]oth systems assert an ultimate authority to eval-
uate whether governmental practices comply with fundamen-
tal rights, and each system sits potentially in judgment over the
other,” it is essential that we find ways to strengthen the effec-
tiveness of mechanisms to filter the harmony and dissonance
between human rights and constitutional rights.20  While some
observers argue for greater constraints on the relationship be-
tween international law and constitutional law,21 others desire
17. Cf. Flaherty, Judicial Globalization, supra note 5, at 490-92; see also R
CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001).
18. Mattias Kumm, Constitutional Democracy Encounters International Law:
Terms of Engagement 1 (N.Y. Univ. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Papers,
Working Paper No. 47, 2006), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=1046&context=nyu/plltwp; see also Alexander Alienikoff,
Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box:  Transnational Law and the U.S. Constitu-
tion, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1989 (2004).
19. See Anupam Chander, Globalization and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1193,
1202 n.40 (2005).
20. Neuman, supra note 13, at 1863. R
21. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347-48 (2002) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (ridiculing as “irrelevant . . . the practices of the ‘world commu-
nity,’ whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of our peo-
ple”); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 869 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (“We must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United
States of America that we are expounding.”); see also H.R. Res. 97, 109th
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a more interdependent relationship, informed and enhanced
by the reality of globalization and the growth of transnational
legal communication.22  My project is to develop a third way by
considering the value of democratic deliberation in negotiat-
ing the tensions inherent in the relationship between interna-
tionalism and constitutionalism,23 while also envisioning an in-
stitutional role for courts as facilitating both democratic values
and international human rights.
II. INTERNATIONALISM AND CONSTITUTIONALISM:
CLASH OR CONVERGENCE?
In this Part, I introduce the broader challenge for the Ar-
ticle, which is the charge that international law poses an irrec-
oncilable obstacle for democracy and for our constitutional
framework.  The first Section explores the relationship be-
tween U.S. commitments to internationalism and constitution-
alism and examines the presumed tensions inherent in that
relationship.  The second Section questions whether recent ef-
forts to tinker with the definition of torture test the relation-
ship between internationalism and constitutionalism.  The re-
mainder of the Article contends that different answers to this
question turn on different conceptions of democracy.
Cong. (2005) (nonbinding resolution discouraging courts from considering
judgments of foreign institutions); S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005) (same).
22. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L.
1103 (2000).
23. In this sense, this Article is an extension of my earlier work. See Cath-
erine Powell, Dialogic Federalism:  Constitutional Possibilities for Incorporation of
Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 245 (2001) [herein-
after Powell, Dialogic Federalism]; Catherine Powell, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance:
Culture, Constitutionalism, and Women’s Human Rights in Post-September 11
America, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 331 (2005) [hereinafter Powell, Lifting the Veil].  It
also seeks to supplement the work other scholars have begun to undertake
in exploring the relationship between international and constitutional law.
Particularly noteworthy for my purposes is Gerald Neuman’s work, which
elaborates a third alternative framework by focusing on the “institutional
consequences of embodying an ideology in two parallel regimes of positive
law” and examines existing “methods employed by international human
rights regimes and various [national] constitutional regimes to prevent or
reduce dissonance between them.”  Neuman, supra note 13, at 1864. R
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A. Tensions Inherent in the Relationship Between Internationalism
and Constitutionalism
Clarifying the content of U.S. commitments to interna-
tionalism and constitutionalism is an important starting point
for understanding the anxiety driving criticism of domestic in-
corporation of international law.  Both sets of commitments
involve claims to special authority as higher law, but they are
conceived of in two fundamentally different ways that are in
tension with each other.  Constitutionalism is based on “the
foundational law a particular polity has given itself through a
special act of popular lawmaking” as the “inaugurating or
foundational act of democratic self-government.”24  On this
view, “[i]t is the self-givenness of the Constitution, not its
universality, that gives it authority as law.”25
By contrast, internationalism “is based on the idea of uni-
versal rights and principles that derive their authority from
sources outside of or prior to national democratic processes.
These rights and principles constrain all politics, including
democratic politics.”26  The universal rights and principles in-
herent in internationalism emerge not from an act of demo-
cratic self-government, but rather as a check and restraint on
democracy.27
24. Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1971, 1975 (2004).  Rubenfeld fleshes out what he refers to as the U.S. brand
of constitutionalism, namely “democratic constitutionalism,” which he fur-
ther describes as a conception that “regards constitutional law as embodying
a particular nation’s fundamental, democratically self-given legal and politi-
cal commitments.” Id. at 1999.
25. Id. at 2006.
26. Id. at 1999.  Rubenfeld actually uses the term “international constitu-
tionalism” to describe this concept.  I have adapted his terminology for the
purposes of this Article.  Describing the distinction between constitutional-
ism and internationalism in this way is consistent with the spirit of
Rubenfeld’s project to distinguish between “democratic constitutionalism”
and “international constitutionalism,” in that he is clear that the contradic-
tion between the two forms of constitutionalism “concerns the relationship
between international law and the deeper commitments of American consti-
tutionalism.” Id. at 1974.
27. Rubenfeld notes that in transcending national boundaries and “ap-
plying to all societies alike,” these universal rights and principles “indeed
exist to check national governments.” Id. at 1975 (insisting that “[i]n this
sense, contemporary international law is deeply antidemocratic”).  While
Rubenfeld acknowledges that the commitments to constitutionalism may
also constrain national democratic will, he finds comfort in the fact that “in
\\server05\productn\N\NYI\40-3\NYI302.txt unknown Seq: 12 28-MAY-08 11:20
734 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 40:723
While internationalism is sometimes misunderstood as
un-American, the United States played a leading role in the
creation and development of modern international law and in-
ternational institutions.28  Admittedly, since its founding, the
United States has also had isolationist and unilateralist tenden-
cies.29  In the aftermath of World War II, for example, Europe-
its creation and over time, constitutional law is not antinational, and is em-
phatically not antidemocratic [for] it aims at democracy over time.” Id. at
1999.  With great care, Rubenfeld describes the ways in which judges in the
United States—even when they exercise judicial review to interpret the Con-
stitution in ways that check the democratic decisions of the political
branches—are tethered to the political process through the appointment
and confirmation process as well as through the possibility of impeachment.
Id. at 1995-96; see also McGinnis & Somin, supra note 10, at 1193 & n.84; R
STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS 16-17 (1994) (noting growing
public and press attention focused on Supreme Court confirmations).
28. Indeed, the United States was the primary driver behind the estab-
lishment of the United Nations system and the development of contempo-
rary treaties and institutional regimes to effectuate those treaties in both
public and private international law. See Sarah Cleveland, Our International
Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 102 (2006) (describing the United States as
the “primary instigator of the UN system and the creation of modern inter-
national treaties ranging from human rights and humanitarian law to inter-
national intellectual property and international trade”); Chander, supra note
19, at 1210, 1227 (noting that “the United States has historically been a ma- R
jor proponent and progenitor of international law norms” and discussing
U.S. influence over international economic law); MARY ANN GLENDON, A
WORLD MADE NEW:  ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001) (describing the history of Universal Declaration of
Human Rights with particular focus on Eleanor Roosevelt’s role as chair of
drafting commission); Annual Message to Congress by President Franklin D.
Roosevelt (Jan. 6, 1941), reprinted in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 663 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1941) (paving the
way for critical concepts in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights);
Louis Henkin, Rights:  American and Human, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 415
(1979) (noting the prominence of American constitutionalism in the devel-
opment of international human rights); NATALIE KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES AND THE SENATE 93 (1990) (describing U.S. influence in shaping
the drafting of the human rights covenants); CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE
PRIZE:  THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, 1944–1955, at 30-57 (2003) (describing the role of U.S. non-
governmental organizations, including, in particular, African American and
Jewish organizations in securing references to human rights in the UN Char-
ter).
29. Rubenfeld, supra note 24, at 1979 (discussing, inter alia, George R
Washington’s desire to avoid “‘foreign entanglements’ [that] could drag the
United States into ‘bloody contests’ in which the nation had no true inter-
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ans were more motivated to embrace internationalism, since
the war’s horrors (particularly the Holocaust) illustrated the
potential dangers of both nationalism and democracy.30  To
the extent American leadership in the post-World War II inter-
nationalism was motivated by “high-minded” ideals (as op-
posed to economic self-interest),31 it was often based on a con-
ception of international law involving the export of American
ideals.32  At the same time, the import of international law to
est”) (citing GEORGE WASHINGTON, WASHINGTON’S FAREWELL ADDRESS 155-56
(Victor Hugo Paltsits ed., 1935) (1796)).
30. Id. at 1984-91 (recalling that “Hitler was elected, and Mussolini rose
to power through parliamentary processes”); see also HANNAH ARENDT, THE
ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 306 (1973) (describing broad popular support
enjoyed by Hitler); A. JAMES GREGOR, ITALIAN FASCISM AND DEVELOPMENTAL
DICTATORSHIP 172-90 (1979) (describing the political victories of Italian Fas-
cist syndicates and popular support for Mussolini in Italy); WILLIAM L.
SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH:  A HISTORY OF NAZI GER-
MANY 115-87 (1960) (describing Hilter’s rise to chancellorship through con-
stitutional processes).
31. Note that American leadership in the post-World War II internation-
alism was motivated as much by a desire to expand American wealth and
power globally as it was to secure American-style freedom and peace.
Rubenfeld, supra note 24, at 1987-88.  Similarly, for Europeans, beyond ex- R
emplifying protection against a repeat of the horrors of World War II, “inte-
gration and international law are means of increasing economic efficiency
and bringing the [U.S] hyperpower to heel.” Id. at 1984.
32. See id. at 1974 (“Because the point of the new international law was to
Americanize, the United States, from its own perspective, did not really need
international law (being already American).”), 1988 (“International law
would be American law, made applicable to other nations.”).  Louis Henkin
contends that “the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and later the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, are in their essence
American constitutional rights projected around the world.”  Henkin, supra
note 28, at 415.  However, while Henkin views the idea of human rights as R
rooted in Western (including American) philosophical thought, he is also
firmly committed to the idea that the United States should apply human
rights at home. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Editorial Comments:  U.S. Ratification of
Human Rights Conventions:  The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM J. INT’L L. 341
[hereinafter Henkin, Editorial Comments].  By contrast, U.S. government offi-
cials have often viewed international law as a means through which to ex-
tend (the American conception of) human rights, rule of law, and democ-
racy to the rest of the world, not as a vehicle for imposing international
standards on the United States.  Note, for example, that while the State De-
partment’s Annual Country Reports on Human Rights document human
rights abuses that occur in countries around the world, it does not include
human rights abuses that occur in the United States. See also Powell, Lifting
the Veil, supra note 23, at 354-55 (documenting how members of the Senate R
\\server05\productn\N\NYI\40-3\NYI302.txt unknown Seq: 14 28-MAY-08 11:20
736 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 40:723
interpret the Constitution has also been an important part of
the American experience since the time of the nation’s found-
ing.33
The monism-dualism dichotomy in international legal
theory tends to view the relationship between international
and constitutional law in the context of this import-export par-
adigm.  The monist view of international law sees it as a kind
of finalized external authority imported to trump national law,
regardless of democratic deliberation.  By contrast, the dualist
perspective views the import of international law as “a corpus
of foreign law which must be filtered first through the prism of
national constitutional law,”34  which typically requires some
form of democratic deliberation before it gains real authority.
Moving beyond the rigid monism-dualism dichotomy, this Arti-
cle adopts the perspective that international and domestic law
are neither imported nor exported to trump one another, but
rather both are co-constitutive of the other35 in ways that rely
Foreign Relations Committee considered the possibility of U.S. ratification
of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women as a way to secure women’s rights overseas—and primarily in the
Arab world—not in the United States).
33. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 28; Harold Hongju Koh, Is International R
Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998) [hereinafter Koh, Inter-
national Law].
34. See Grainne de Burca & Oliver Gerstenberg, The Denationalization of
Constitutional Law, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 243, 244 (2006) (noting that accord-
ing to the monist-dualist dichotomy, “international law is either an authorita-
tive external body of law which directly penetrates the national legal order,
or a corpus of foreign law which must be filtered first through the prism of
national constitutional law”).
35. Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transna-
tional Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J
487, 490 (2005) (explaining that “the relationship between international
and domestic legal norms is more properly conceived of as a co-constitutive,
or synergistic, relationship in which domestic courts worldwide are becom-
ing active participants in the dynamic process of developing international
law”).  Waters points out:
Law and society scholars, writing on issues arising under U.S. law,
have used the term “co-constitutive” to describe the mutually rein-
forcing relationship between law and society (or law and culture).
Viewed through a co-constitutive lens, “the relation between law
and society is not unidirectional; rather, legal life and everyday so-
cial life are mutually conditioning and constraining.”  Thus, “co-
constitutive theory explores both how law shapes society and how
society shapes law. . . .  Translating this concept into the interna-
\\server05\productn\N\NYI\40-3\NYI302.txt unknown Seq: 15 28-MAY-08 11:20
2008] TINKERING WITH TORTURE IN THE AFTERMATH OF HAMDAN 737
on various forms of democratic deliberation.  International
law shapes domestic law and culture, and vice versa, in a mutu-
ally reinforcing relationship.  The dialogue that occurs be-
tween these two bodies of law is mediated through executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of government consistent
with the constitutional conception of democracy I advance in
this Article.  In the context of this mutually reinforcing rela-
tionship, international law norms trickle down, move side-to-
side, and trickle up.36
tional context, I use the term “co-constitutive” to describe the mu-
tually reinforcing relations between international legal norms and
domestic culture and societal norms.
Id. at 490, 502 (internal citations omitted).
36. First, “international law norms ‘trickle down’ and become incorpo-
rated into domestic legal systems” which, in the United States, involve demo-
cratic “mechanisms of ‘vertical domestication.’”  Harold Hongju Koh, The
1998 Franckel Lecture:  Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623,
626-27 (offering a transnational legal process theory account of this “vertical
story” through which international norms are internalized).  Second, inter-
national law norms move side-to-side at a peer-to-peer or state-to-state level,
which has the potential to “reinvigorate democracy . . . by opening areas of
domestic rulemaking to a wider range of information, experience, and argu-
ment,” resulting in new forms of governance that have “a potentially democ-
ratizing destabilization effect on domestic politics.”  Joshua Cohen & Charles
F. Sabel, Global Democracy, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 763, 766, 784-85
(2005).  Cohen and Sabel elaborate on the “horizontal story” of transna-
tional lawmaking by discussing the basic architecture of new forms of ac-
countability and deliberation that allow for peer review of international and
comparative law norms:
The requirement that each national administration justify its
choice of rules publicly, in light of comparable choices by the
others, allows traditional political actors, new ones emerging from
civil society, and coalitions among these to contest official propos-
als against the backdrop of much richer information about the
range of arguably feasible choices and better understanding of the
argument about their merits than traditionally available in domes-
tic debate.
Id. at 784; see also Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights:
How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016 (2004) (describing
the destabilizing effect of public law litigation, which I see as analogous to
the destabilizing effects of international law on domestic law); Ryan Good-
man & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States:  Socialization and International
Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 626 (2004) [hereinafter Goodman &
Jinks, How to Influence States] (noting how a state’s identification with a refer-
ence or peer group of states “generates varying degrees of cognitive and
social pressures—real or imagined—to conform” to international law).
Third and finally, international law norms trickle up. See, e.g., Janet Koven
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Because international law is “incomplete,” it is interpreta-
tively open and invites domestic actors to be involved in the
process of its creation.37  In the U.S. context, this means that
norms developed democratically at the domestic level play a
gap-filling function and have the potential to inform interna-
tional law (and visa versa) through a continually iterative pro-
cess.
International legal norms—and especially human rights
norms—are frequently open to interpretation, and national
actors are part of the interpretative community that gives
meaning to them.  Even the prohibition on torture—once
thought to enjoy widespread consensus—is back on the
agenda in the United States:  not the question of torture’s le-
gality under international law, since even the Bush Administra-
tion agrees it is illegal, but rather the question of what consti-
tutes torture.  Take, for example, Vice-President Dick Che-
ney’s claim when asked about waterboarding detainees that “a
Levit, Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking:  The Tale of Three Trade
Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125 (2005); Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-
Up International Lawmaking:  Reflections on the New Haven School of International
Law, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 393 (2007).
37. I would like to thank my colleague, Grainne de Burca, for bringing
this point to my attention.  Cass Sunstein raises an analogous point in the
context of constitutional law in his concept of “incompletely theorized
agreements.”  Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 1733 (1995).  Sunstein claims that “[p]articipants in legal controversies
try to produce incompletely theorized agreements on particular out-
comes . . . .  When they disagree on an [abstract principle], they move to a
level of greater particularity.” Id. at 1735-36.  In a sense, international law-
making works in reverse by producing incompletely theorized agreements
on abstract principle when negotiators disagree on particular outcomes. Cf.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword:  The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 22 (1992) (discussing the distinction between broad standards and
precise rules as a spectrum rather than a sharp dichotomy).  Indeed, interna-
tional relations theorists have their own version of “incomplete contracting,”
which they use to describe what states do when they make particular treaties
and then delegate power to “complete” the agreement to agents (i.e. inter-
national tribunals and courts). See, e.g., Karen J. Alter, Delegation to Interna-
tional Courts and the Limits of Recontracting Political Power, in DELEGATION AND
AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 312 (Darren G. Hawkins et al.
eds., 2006); Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, Constructing a Suprana-
tional Constitution:  Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Commu-
nity, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63. 63-81 (1998).
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little dunking in water” is not torture.38  The torture debate
both shows that international norms should never be taken for
granted and illustrates the continuous process of interpreting
these norms in which national actors—courts, political actors,
nongovernmental organizations, etc.—have a potential role to
play.
While hardly new, the U.S. Supreme Court’s more recent
resort to international and comparative law in a number of
high-profile, controversial cases—involving the death penalty,
affirmative action, and the rights of gays and lesbians39—has
triggered a tidal wave of complaints about the lack of demo-
cratic legitimacy inherent in using international law to inter-
pret the Constitution.40  However, although critics call for
greater democratic process before courts can rely on interna-
tional and comparative law in interpreting the Constitution,
38. When asked about waterboarding, Vice President Cheney said:
“[T]hat’s been a very important tool that we’ve had to be able to [use to]
secure the nation. . . .  It’s a no-brainer for me. . . .”  Interview by Scott
Hennen with Vice President Richard Cheney, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 24,
2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/
20061024-7.html.  More recently, President Bush’s Attorney General-desig-
nate Michael B. Mukasey hedged in responding to a question during his
confirmation hearings concerning whether he considered waterboarding
constitutional, saying:  “I don’t know what is involved in the technique. . . . If
it amounts to torture, it is not constitutional.”  Philip Shenon, Senators Clash
With Nominee About Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2007, at A1 (emphasis ad-
ded).
39. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (striking down execu-
tions of people with mental disabilities); Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183
(2005) (striking down executions of juveniles); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003) (striking down anti-sodomy law); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003) (striking down the University of Michigan’s race-conscious freshman
admissions policy); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding
University of Michigan Law School’s race-conscious admissions program).
40. For discussion of the fact that the United States has a long history of
resorting to international law in constitutional interpretation, see generally
Cleveland, supra note 28.  Note that while recent criticism has focused on R
both international and comparative law, my Article primarily examines the
debate concerning the resort to international law—not the debate concern-
ing citation of comparative practices of foreign states.  While the use of com-
parative or foreign law in constitutional analysis raises some of the same con-
cerns implicated by resort to international law, citation to the comparative
practices of individual states raises additional complexities, such as the risk
of misapplying “culturally contingent foreign practice and legitimacy con-
cerns arising from selective and anecdotal use.”  Cleveland, supra note 28, at R
11 (noting the importance of maintaining the distinction).
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many of the same critics have argued for less democratic pro-
cess in the use (or rejection) of international law to regulate
treatment of detainees captured in President Bush’s War on
Terror.
B. Tinkering With Torture
In recent debates about the validity of using coercion in
the interrogation of detained terrorism suspects, the President
has not publicly rejected the international prohibition on tor-
ture.  On the contrary, President Bush has proclaimed that his
Administration does not tolerate torture.41  At the same time,
the Administration has deployed an array of structural argu-
ments to claim that the President’s has authority as Com-
mander-in-Chief to determine the scope of domestic incorpo-
ration of international law.  This supposed authority has in
turn been employed to justify the use of what have euphemisti-
cally been called “enhanced interrogation techniques” to ex-
tract intelligence.42  Until challenged, the Administration has
41. For example, in June 2004, President Bush said:
Today . . . the United States reaffirms its commitment to the world-
wide elimination of torture. . . .  Freedom from torture is an ina-
lienable human right, and we are committed to building a world
where human rights are respected and protected by the rule of law.
To help fulfill this commitment, the United States has joined 135
other nations in ratifying the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
America stands against and will not tolerate torture.  We will investi-
gate and prosecute all acts of torture and undertake to prevent
other cruel and unusual punishment in all territory under our ju-
risdiction.  American personnel are required to comply with all
U.S. laws, including the United States Constitution, Federal stat-
utes, including statutes prohibiting torture and our treaty obligations
with respect to the treatment of all detainees.
President George W. Bush, Statement on the U.N. International Day in Sup-
port of Victims of Torture (June 26, 2004), available at http://whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040626-19.html (emphasis added).
42. These techniques have reportedly included methods such as
waterboarding, sleep and sensory deprivation, temperature and light and di-
etary manipulation, and stress positions.  Putting to one side the legality of
using these interrogation techniques, their efficacy in gathering reliable in-
telligence has been challenged.  For discussion of the ineffectiveness of tor-
ture, see for example Mary Ellen O’Connell, Affirming the Ban on Harsh Inter-
rogation, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1231, 1259-64 (2005) (quoting experienced inter-
rogators).  For thoughtful philosophical and jurisprudential critiques of the
use of torture and ticking bomb scenarios to justify the use of torture, see
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tended to authorize torture quietly—a practice that hints at its
illegality.43
However, in other countries, the use of moderate to harsh
physical interrogation techniques on suspected terrorists has
been deemed illegal as torture, or something akin to torture.44
In fact, the United States itself prosecuted the use of water tor-
ture on U.S. soldiers in trials brought against Japanese soldiers
following World War II through U.S. military commissions and
the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal.45  How, then, do we make
David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425
(2005); Waldron, supra note 13. R
43. The public has primarily learned about interrogation techniques that
are tantamount to torture through leaks to the press or “the marvel of digital
technology [which has] allowed Americans to see what their soldiers were
doing to prisoners in their name,” leading Mark Danner to declare that
“[w]e are all torturers now.”  Mark Danner, We are All Torturers Now, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 6, 2005, at A27.  Torture has also been reportedly outsourced to
third countries to which the United States “renders” terrorism suspects or
has occurred in secret Central Bureau of Intelligence (CIA) prisons beyond
the reach of monitors from the International Committee of the Red Cross.
See, e.g., Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless:  Extraordinary Rendi-
tion and the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1333 (2007).
44. For a comparative perspective, see for example HCJ 5100/94 Public
Committee Against Torture v. Israel [1999] IsrSC 46(2) (prohibiting in a
landmark decision by the Israeli Supreme Court moderate physical interro-
gation methods by the Israeli General Security Services, though leaving the
door open to the defense of necessity); Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978) (finding that when used in combination, coercive
interrogation techniques—such as holding a detainee in a cold cell, depriv-
ing him of sleep, hooding him, and playing loud music in his cell—fell short
of torture, but constituted cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment).
45. Evan Wallach, Drop by Drop:  Forgetting the History of Water Torture in
U.S. Courts, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 468 (2007).  Note that the Tokyo
War Crimes Tribunal (also known as the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East) applied the same general rules and procedures as the better-
known Nuremburg Trial.  In the World War II context, the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East described the “water treatment” as follows:
The so-called “water treatment” was commonly applied.  The victim
was bound or otherwise secured in a prone position; and water was
forced through his mouth and nostrils into his lungs and stomach
until he lost consciousness.  Pressure was then applied, sometimes
by jumping upon his abdomen to force the water out.  The usual
practice was to revive the victim and successively repeat the process.
The Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 1946
(1948), at 1059, available at http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/
IMTFE/IMTFE-8.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2008); see also United States v.
Chinsaku Yuki, Manila (1946), NARA NND 775011 Record Group 331 Box
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sense of the fact that the President has stood up for the sub-
stantive principle that torture is wrong while simultaneously
stressing his executive powers to interpret international law
obligations and using those powers to justify interrogation
techniques, such as waterboarding, which amount to torture
(and which the United States has in the past prosecuted as
torture)?46
It is hardly surprising that the White House has tried to
characterize what is essentially a substantive disagreement over
the content of international law as a disagreement over struc-
ture.  “Disagreements about the content of [substantive]
norms are [often] recast as procedural disagreements about
the requirements of derogation regimes.”47  In the context of
torture, governments rarely directly challenge the substantive
content of international prohibitions.  They instead deny their
acts constitute torture or deflect criticism by making structural
or procedural arguments.  No government will stand up to say
“I torture and I’m proud of it”; rather, governments say:  “it
1586 (involving a defendant placing a towel over the victim’s face and con-
tinuously pouring water over them, then sitting on the victim’s stomach caus-
ing the victim to vomit).  For a fuller discussion of World War II precedents,
see Wallach, supra note 45. R
46. Interrogation techniques using water to induce the sensation of
drowning in the person under questioning have, in recent news accounts,
generally been called “waterboarding.” See, e.g., David Johnston & James
Risen, Aides Say Memo Backed Coercion Already in Use, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
2004, at A1 (“Mr. Mohammed was ‘waterboarded’—strapped to a board and
immersed in water—a technique used to make the subject believe that he
might be drowned, officials said[.]”); Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, C.I.A.
Expands Its Inquiry into Interrogation Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2004, at A10
(“Former intelligence officials say that lawyers from the C.I.A. and the Justice
Department have been involved in extensive discussions in recent months to
review the legal basis for some extreme tactics used at those secret centers,
including ‘waterboarding,’ in which a detainee is strapped down, dunked
under water and made to believe that he might be drowned.”).
47. Derek P. Jinks, The Anatomy of an Institutionalized Emergency:  Preventive
Detention and Personal Liberty in India, 22 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 311, 312-13 (2001).
Too often, consideration of U.S. treaty obligations gets trapped within the
debate over structure (whether federalism or separation of powers) rather
than a debate over substance.  Just as the unsuccessful U.S. ratification de-
bates on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women got caught in the trap of federalism (as I have argued else-
where), so too the torture debate has gotten caught in the trap of separation
of powers. See Powell, Lifting the Veil, supra note 23, at 336. R
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wasn’t really me”48; “it really wasn’t torture”49; “I wasn’t really
bound by the relevant international standards at the time the
torture occurred”50; or “the relevant international standards
didn’t apply to the location where the torture occurred.”51
Such obfuscation clouds the critical question of whether gov-
ernments are substantively rejecting the torture prohibition on
the merits.
Some argue that if we in the United States are going to
tinker with torture—if we are going to take the unprecedented
step of breaching our Geneva obligations by allowing “torture
lite”52 through “alternative” or “tough” interrogation tech-
niques—then the President and Congress should do so
48. See, e.g., Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras Case, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (July 29, 1988) (rejecting Honduras’ argument that there
was insufficient evidence that the alleged torture was conducted by a state
actor as opposed to a private actor).
49. See, e.g., Ireland v. U.K., 25 Eur. Ct. of H.R. (ser. A) (1978) (finding
that even when used in combination, coercive interrogation techniques—
such as holding a detainee in a cold cell, depriving him of sleep, hooding
him, and playing loud music in his cell—fell short of torture).
50. See, e.g., R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate Ex Parte
Pinochet Ugarte, [2000] 1 A.C. 61 (H.L.) (holding that under the principle
of dual criminality, former Chilean dictator Pinochet could only be held ac-
countable for torture that occurred after the Convention Against Torture
had been ratified by both Spain and the United Kingdom).
51. See Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture,
United States of America, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 ¶ 15 (July 25, 2006)
[hereinafter Committee Against Torture].  Referring to the U.S. position that its
international obligations do not apply on Guantanamo, for example, the
Committee notes that:
[A] number of the Convention’s provisions are expressed as apply-
ing to “territory under [the State party’s] jurisdiction” (articles 2, 5,
13, 16).  The Committee reiterates its previously expressed view
that this includes all areas under the de facto effective control of the
State party, by whichever military or civil authorities such control is
exercized.  The Committee considers that the State party’s view
that those provisions are geographically limited to its own de jure
territory to be regrettable [sic]. The State party should recognize and
ensure that the provisions of the Convention expressed as applicable to “terri-
tory under the State party’s jurisdiction” apply to, and are fully enjoyed, by
all persons under the effective control of its authorities, of whichever type,
wherever located in the world.
Id. (emphasis in original).
52. Luban, supra note 42, at 1437 (noting that some refer to sleep depri- R
vation, prolonged standing in stress positions, extremes of heat and cold,
bright lights and loud music as “torture lite”).
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openly, publicly, candidly, and substantively, with a full public
record of which elected officials approve and which oppose
the use of specific coercive methods of interrogation.53  If tor-
ture is going to be committed in our names, these observers
argue, we have the right to know the details.  After all, by using
torture, “we [are] relinquish[ing] the very ideological advan-
tage” upon which the War on Terror depends.54  The ques-
tions I pose in this Article, then, are as follows:  Should a rule
as fundamental as the prohibition on torture be reexamined
by the democratic process, how broadly do we define that pro-
cess, and what is the role of courts and international law in
that process?
III. COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW
This Part of the Article explores different conceptions of
democracy.  Differing conceptions of democracy lead to differ-
ing positions on the question of torture.   By the same token,
these contrasting notions of democracy lead to contrasting
views on the democratic function of courts and international
law in defining the domestic scope of the torture prohibition.
Here I argue that the methods used by the executive
branch to unilaterally justify the use of torture ultimately un-
dermine democracy.  In fact, a “purely electoral”55 view of de-
mocracy conceivably justifies the position that, as the people’s
elected representative, the President should have absolute uni-
lateral power in the War on Terror (putting to one side separa-
tion of powers concerns).  However, this Article calls for a
broader conception of democracy, one which combines robust
53. See, e.g., Posting of Martin Lederman, The CIA’s “Alternative Set of
Procedures”:  Calling Things by Their Right Names, to Balkinization, http:/
/balkin.blogspot.com/2006/09/cias-alternative-set-of-procedures.html
(Sept. 6, 2006) (persuasively calling for greater transparency in the process).
54. Danner, supra note 43, at A27.  Danner notes that the President says R
we are fighting for “the promotion of democracy, freedom and human
rights [which he] has so persistently claimed is America’s most powerful
weapon in defeating Islamic extremism.” Id.
55. See Robert O. Keohane et al., Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism 10
(Inst. for Int’l Law & Justice, Global Admin. Law Series, IILJ Working Paper
2007/4, 2007), available at http://iilj.org/publications/documents/2007-
4.GAL.KMM.web.pdf (explaining that understanding democracy in “purely
electoral terms” is a “minimalist” approach to democracy).
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procedural protections for those underrepresented in the
electoral political process with substantive guarantees for fun-
damental rights.
As Ronald Dworkin has provocatively noted:  “Democracy
means government by the people.  But what does that mean?
. . . .  [I]t is a matter of deep controversy what democracy really
is.”56  Dworkin suggests two distinct visions of democracy:
majoritarian and constitutional.57  This Part of the Article uses
Dworkin’s two conceptions of democracy to reveal how differ-
ent positions on the question of torture reflect different un-
derstandings of the meaning of democracy.  I also show that
the two democracy-related claims made by critics of domestic
incorporation of international law turn on contradictory views
about the requirements of democracy.
A. Majoritarian Conception of Democracy
The majoritarian conception of democracy involves “polit-
ical procedures [that] should be designed so that, at least on
important matters, the decision that is reached is the decision
the majority or a plurality of citizens favors, or would favor if it
had adequate information and the time for reflection.”58  This
view is consistent with the “purely electoral”59 approach es-
poused by critics of domestic incorporation of international
law.  Among these critics, however, we observe two variants:  a
thin majoritarian conception and a thick majoritarian concep-
tion.
The thin majoritarian conception demands that the Presi-
dent should be able to unilaterally do what he wants to do—
even when this means disregarding statutes regulating how the
executive branch can treat detainees.  Proponents of this view
“[share] a belief that the biggest obstacle to a vigorous re-
sponse to the 9/11 attacks was the set of domestic and interna-
tional law that arose in the 1970s to constrain the President’s
56. DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 15.  I would like to thank Joshua Cohen R
for encouraging me to explore Dworkin’s work on democracy and for a vari-
ety of helpful insights on the subject of democracy more generally.
57. Id. at 15-20.
58. Id. at 15-16 (describing what he calls “the majoritarian premise” or
“majoritarian conception of democracy”).
59. Keohane et al., supra note 55, at 10. R
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powers in response to the excesses of Watergate and the Viet-
nam War.”60
The thick majoritarian conception of democracy envi-
sions a slightly broader view by embracing a role for Congress.
As with the thin majoritarian perspective, this approach resists
the role that courts play in protecting international human
rights as anti-democratic.  Unlike the thinner approach to ma-
joritarianism, however, the thick view allows for checks and
balances on the Executive through Congress.  Also, this ap-
proach depends on greater transparency, public access to in-
formation, and democratic deliberation.61  Critics of domestic
incorporation of international law who argue that interna-
tional law requires greater democratic review before courts
can resort to it for constitutional interpretation espouse this
view.  Far from being an exclusively conservative position, this
thicker perspective is also advanced by the progressive left,
which has pushed for more vibrant forms of democratic delib-
eration over international law, for example, in the context of
international negotiations over trade policy.  Just as I am skep-
tical of the ideologically conservative brand of majoritarian-
ism, so too am I skeptical that the broad-based populism ad-
vanced by, for example, some leftist World Trade Organiza-
tion protesters, goes far enough to address the broader
concerns reflected in the constitutional conception described
in the next section.62
60. Jeffrey Rosen, Conscience of a Conservative, N.Y. TIMES MAG. Sept. 9,
2007, at 43.
61. In fact, one might argue that the existence of a fully informed citi-
zenry is a prerequisite for the majoritarian conception to be coherent. See
DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 17 (implying that the majoritarian conception R
depends on the notion that “a defining goal of democracy [is] that collective
decisions always or normally be those that a majority or plurality of citizens
would favor if fully informed and rational,” but ultimately rejecting this view
as insufficient in contrast to the broader constitutional conception of de-
mocracy).
62. For discussion of criticism of international trade law from the pro-
gressive left, see Chander, supra note 19, at 1197 (discussing objections R
raised by Lori Wallach of Public Citizen).  Relatedly, in the area of interna-
tional economic law and development assistance, see generally JOSEPH E.
STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002) (criticizing the Inter-
national Monetary Fund’s policies from the perspective of the author, a
Nobel laureate in economics and former chief economist at the World
Bank).
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Some critics of international law advance the thin
majoritarian conception in the War on Terror context even
while advancing the thick view of democracy in the constitu-
tional interpretation context.  While these two democracy-re-
lated claims share a deep mistrust of courts as undemocratic,
they turn on very different understandings about the require-
ments of democracy as regards the value of checks and bal-
ances, transparency, public access to information, and the
scope of the public’s participation in government decision-
making.
B. Constitutional Conception of Democracy
An alternative to the majoritarian view is the constitu-
tional conception of democracy.  This recognizes that court ac-
cess and judicial review perform important democratic func-
tions along with the political branches.  Courts perform a
unique democratic function by providing a means of redress
for people underrepresented in the electoral political process.
Efforts to eliminate habeas corpus and other forms of judicial
relief—even when these efforts are adopted through the elec-
toral process—are antidemocratic63 in that they restrict the
important democratic role courts play in offering those under-
represented in the political process an alternative way to par-
ticipate in and correct government decisionmaking.
This vision of constitutional democracy combines the
majoritarian notion of electoral politics with constitutional fac-
tors that serve as liberal restraints on populism.64  Such factors
include, “at a minimum, the separation of powers, in particu-
lar the independence of the judiciary; the satisfaction of rule-
of-law constraints in the operation of government; the en-
63. I use the term “antidemocratic” rather than “undemocratic” in an
analogy to Louis Henkin’s use of the phrase “anticonstitutional” rather than
“unconstitutional.”  Habeas stripping, even if done through “democratic”
means in a majoritarian sense, is against the spirit of democracy because of
the important democratic work that courts perform. Cf. Henkin, Editorial
Comments, supra note 32, at 349 (proclaiming that “[l]awyers in the United R
States should take arms against the anticonstitutional practice of declaring
human rights conventions non-self-executing”).
64. Keohane et al., supra note 55, at 10 (urging us to combine the electo- R
ral controls that are “the majoritarian motor” of  democracy with  “non-elec-
toral, constitutional arrangements [that] serve as necessary ‘liberal’ re-
straints on ‘populist’ inputs”).
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trenchment of basic rights among the citizenry; and provision
for public deliberation and contestation.”65  Therefore, this
perspective grounds democracy in a notion of constitutional
self-government that is more fully representative of all the peo-
ple than the raw majoritarianism of pure electoral politics.66
The political processes included in the constitutional concep-
tion “represent means whereby the people exercise more ef-
fective control over government.”67
In fact, the constitutional conception of democracy re-
jects “the majoritarian premise.”68  Rather than idealizing the
collective decisions that a majority or plurality of citizens
would choose based upon full information, this view “takes the
defining aim of democracy to be a different one:  that collec-
tive decisions be made by political institutions whose structure,
composition, and practices treat all members of the commu-
nity, as individuals, with equal concern and respect.”69  Thus,
while this approach assumes that the day-to-day operation of
government will be undertaken by representatives chosen
through popular elections, Dworkin points out that it also “re-
quires these majoritarian procedures out of a concern for the
equal status of citizens, and not out of any commitment to the
goals of majority rule.”70  On this view, then, non-majoritarian
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2 (borrowing the phrase “constitutional self-government” from
EISGRUBER, supra note 17). R
67. Id. at 11.  Emphasizing the limits of elections in modern mass democ-
racies as mechanisms for registering public opinion, Keohane et al. note:
Many factors argue against identifying election results straightfor-
wardly with the will of the people: voting procedures often allow a
small portion of the electorate to decide a contest; the size of the
electorate and the complexity of public issues discourage sustained
attention to politics, and indeed considerable evidence suggests
that voters’ knowledge of public issues and candidate positions is
low; voters are offered a limited range of options from which to
choose.
Id. at 11 n.15; see also JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND
DEMOCRACY (2d ed. 1947); Philip Converse, The Nature of Belief Systems in
Mass Publics, in IDEOLOGY AND DISCONTENT (David Apter ed., 1964); Larry
Bartels, Uninformed Votes, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 194 (1996); Larry Bartels, Homer
Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American Mind, 3 PERSP. ON
POL. 15 (2005).
68. DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 17. R
69. Id.
70. Id.
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institutions such as courts play an indispensable role when
they are necessary to safeguard the equal status inherent in
this conception of democracy.  This is so because, as Dworkin
notes, “[d]emocracy means government subject to condi-
tions—. . . ‘democratic’ conditions—of equal status for all citi-
zens.”71
While Dworkin’s focus is on the equal status of citizens, in
his more recent work, which develops a larger theory about
human rights, he insists that governments need to provide the
same basic rights to noncitizens as are provided to citizens.72
Speaking critically of the failure to apply the same standards of
justice to suspected terrorists detained in Guantanamo and
elsewhere as are applied to citizen criminal suspects, Dworkin
contends that this disparity shows “that we do not regard them
as fully human.”73  He argues for “a conception of human
rights that is grounded in . . . human dignity,” which “de-
mands that any government, whatever its traditions and prac-
tices, act consistently with some good-faith understanding of
the equal intrinsic importance of people’s lives.”74  Thus,
“[w]hile different political communities can legitimately adopt
different views of the basic rights that are required by human
dignity, every community must protect a set of basic rights that
are singled out by some reasonable interpretation of the re-
quirements of human dignity.”75  Once a society has devel-
oped its own understanding of the requirements of human
dignity, it may “not deny the benefit of that understanding to
anyone” under its power, regardless of citizenship.76  There-
fore, the American policy of indefinite detention of suspected
terrorists without trial “violates the human rights of those we
imprison”77 and is “made no more acceptable by Congres-
sional endorsement.”78
71. Id.
72. RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE?:  PRINCIPLES FOR A
NEW POLITICAL DEBATE 43-46 (2006) [hereinafter DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY
POSSIBLE HERE?].
73. Id. at 45.
74. Id.
75. Joshua Cohen, Taking Democracy Seriously 7-8 (reviewing DWORKIN,
IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE?, supra note 72) (unpublished manuscript, on R
file with author).
76. DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE?, supra note 72, at 46. R
77. Id. at 46.
78. Cohen, supra note 75, at 7-8. R
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A defense of the role of courts in safeguarding the equal
treatment inherent in the constitutional conception of democ-
racy is also consistent with John Hart Ely’s famous defense of
judicial protection of minority rights as representation-rein-
forcing.79  While Ely’s theory of judicial review relates to mi-
norities who are citizens, he expresses concern about those
noncitizens in our midst who “cannot vote in any state, which
means that any representation they receive will be exclusively
‘virtual.’”80
As with the majoritarian conception, the constitutional
conception of democracy involves two variants.  The thin con-
stitutional conception of democracy envisions a role for courts
when the political branches have failed to respect equal treat-
ment, but does not necessarily embrace a role for courts to
protect other substantive rights beyond the right to equality.
The thick constitutional conception of democracy, by contrast,
envisions a role for courts to enforce additional fundamental
rights beyond the right to equality.
Neal Katyal advances a thin constitutional conception of
democracy in the context of the War on Terror by insisting on
79. In his well-known theory of judicial review, Ely suggests that courts
may intervene in the political process when political market failures occur,
such as when:
(1) the ins are choking off the channels of political change to en-
sure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2) though
no one is actually denied a voice or a vote, representatives be-
holden to an effective majority are systematically disadvantaging
some minority out of simple hostility or prejudiced refusal to recog-
nize commonalities of interest, and thereby denying that minority
the protection afforded other groups by a representative system.
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
103 (1980).
80. Id. at 161.  Ely goes on to point out that “our legislatures are com-
posed almost entirely of citizens.” Id. Of course, some of the post-9/11 de-
tainees have been American citizens of Middle Eastern or Arab descent or
who practice Islam.  While, as a group, the citizen detainees do not have the
same experience of total political disenfranchisement as the noncitizen de-
tainees, they are in effect a discrete and insular minority that has been
targeted by a rising tide of violence and discrimination.  Leti Volpp, The Citi-
zen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002).  In fact, the very consoli-
dation of a new identity category that groups together persons who appear
“Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim,” signals “a racialization wherein members
of this group are identified as terrorists and are disidentified as citizens.” Id.
at 1576.
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judicial oversight where the political branches have failed to
respect equal treatment between citizens and noncitizens.81
Beyond insisting on a right of equality, however, Katyal is re-
luctant to “freeze a particular substantive conception of law
into place,” since the “questions posed by terrorism are just
too new and the dangers of asymmetrical warfare (both in
probability and extent of damage) too uncertain at this early
date.”82  While legislation is normally entitled to deference by
courts, Katyal points out that the rationale for such deference
is undercut “[w]hen legislation singles out powerless aliens,”
since, after all, “the standard checks on government abuse,
such as political accountability, fail to operate.”83  The exam-
ple that Katyal gives is the Military Commissions Act (MCA),
which singles out noncitizens for trial in military commissions
and strips habeas access to U.S. courts, while presumably leav-
ing intact regular trials or court-martial hearings for citizen de-
tainees.84  Katyal argues:
Equal protection offers [a] vehicle to achieve a focus
on process instead of substance. . . .  [E]qual protec-
tion challenges to the MCA, for example, do not ask
whether Congress can authorize military commis-
sions or strip habeas rights; they simply say that
whatever substantive rules Congress settles upon, it
must apply them symmetrically to all persons.85
81. Katyal, supra note 8, at 1382; see also DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE
HERE?, supra note 72, at 43-46. R
82. Katyal, supra note 8, at 1365-66.
83. Id. at 1367.
84. Id. at 1379 (“[E]verything about the Equal Protection Clause—from
its plain text to its original intent—shudders at the notion that access to
justice could be conditioned on citizenship.”).  Note that the Fourth Circuit
recently held that the habeas stripping provisions of the MCA do not apply
to a lawful resident alien detained in his home within the United States.  Al
Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007).  However, the D.C. Circuit has
upheld the validity of the habeas stripping provisions as regards those nonci-
tizens detained in Guantanamo. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (upholding habeas stripping provisions of the Military Com-
missions Act), rev’d, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).  The legality of the habeas strip-
ping provisions of the Military Commissions Act is an issue currently before
the Supreme Court.  See Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(upholding habeas stripping provisions of the MCA), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct.
3078 (2007).
85. Katyal, supra note 8, at 1382. R
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The fact that noncitizens must rely on virtual rather than
actual representation means that courts should insist on equal
treatment between citizens and noncitizens.86  By bootstrap-
ping the rights of noncitizens to those of citizens, courts could
ensure that “aliens would be ‘virtually’ represented by citizens
and the political process.”87  If courts were to require that the
political branches bootstrap the rights of noncitizens to citi-
zens, they could guarantee “that the interests of those that do
not have a voice in the legislature are effectively represented
by those that do.”88
However, rather than view equality as a substantive right,
Katyal explains:
The structural logic of insisting on equality in this
area has, as its starting point, a deep unease about
the proper substantive standard.  Instead, the focus
rests upon the decision-making process and ensuring
that the interests of those that do not have a voice in
the legislature are effectively represented by those
that do.  Under those conditions, the legislature will
be less likely to externalize their problems onto the
powerless, and more likely to reach a better decision.
The powerless, in effect, give their proxy vote to the
powerful, knowing that when the powerful are
brought within the ambit of the laws, lawmaking is
likely to become fairer.  The process of virtual repre-
sentation . . . also has the benefit of forcing legislative
reconsideration of questionable choices.89
86. Id. at 1373 (citing ELY, supra note 79, at 161-62). R
87. Id. at 1369.
88. Id. at 1382.
89. Id. at 1382.  Interestingly, as an example of this approach in practice,
Katyal cites to a case by the House of Lords in the United Kingdom which,
on discrimination grounds, struck down a policy that allowed non-U.K. na-
tionals to be detained while U.K. nationals could go free. Id. at 1392 (dis-
cussing A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dept., [2005] 2 A.C. 68 (H.L.)).  As
Katyal points out:
Sadly, the experience of Britain under the European Convention
on Human Rights is far truer to our backbone of equality than that
of our own politicians under our own Constitution, who conve-
niently forget about equality even on fundamental decisions such
as who would face a military trial with the death penalty at stake.
Indeed, the United Kingdom reacted to the decision by adopting
laws that treated citizens and foreigners alike.  Although our Foun-
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By contrast, the thick constitutional conception of democ-
racy, which this Article supports, takes a more substantive ap-
proach and is premised on the view that judicial intervention
is warranted to remedy violations of fundamental rights above
and beyond the basic right to equality.  To the extent that
“[d]emocracy means government subject to . . . ‘democratic’
conditions,”90 we can think of the preservation of human dig-
nity as a democratic condition ensuring basic forms of individ-
ual autonomy, personal liberty, and bodily integrity.  After all,
“[t]he most basic of human rights . . . is the right to be treated
by government with a certain attitude:  with the respect due a
human being.”91  The prohibition on torture is one such fun-
damental right inherent in human dignity, because, as Dwor-
kin explains:
[T]orture’s object is precisely not just to damage but
to destroy a human being’s power to decide for him-
self what his loyalty and convictions permit him to do.
Offering inducement such as a reduced sentence to
an accused criminal in exchange for information,
however objectionable this might seem on other
grounds, leaves a prisoner’s ability to weigh costs and
consequences intact.  Torture is designed to extin-
guish that power, to reduce its victim to a screaming
animal for whom decision is no longer possible—the
most profound insult to his humanity, the most
profound outrage of his human rights.92
In this view, certain rights are so inherent in human dig-
nity that they may not be taken away through the political pro-
cess.  In international law, such fundamental rights, including
the prohibition on torture, are considered to be jus cogens.  A
jus cogens norm is a peremptory norm that can only be re-
ders broke away from Britain in part because of the King’s refusal
to adhere to the basic proposition that “all men are created equal,”
it is now Britain that is teaching us about the meaning of those
words.
Id.
90. DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 17. R
91. DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE?, supra note 72, at 42. R
92. Id. at 38-39.
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placed by another norm of comparable character.93  Such
norms cannot be undone by domestic legislation.  While coun-
termajoritarian, such norms are justified and protected from
the political process on the ground that they entrench rights
essential to preserving basic human dignity.
Moreover, safeguarding such norms may also be justified
on the grounds that deprivation of such fundamental human
rights disproportionately affects minority and outsider groups.
International human rights law may be viewed as “a possible
buttress to democracy, rather than as its rival,” since it “creates
additional resources with which minorities can protect them-
selves from majoritarian oppression.”94  In this sense, jus cogens
“can be justified as democracy enhancing,” since “[s]uch
norms [often] seek to protect certain classes of minorities in a
world where minorities [and vulnerable individuals more gen-
erally] are constantly at risk.”95  Echoing Ely, David Cole re-
minds us that “the fact that the Constitution denies aliens the
right to vote makes it much more essential that . . . basic
[human] rights . . . be extended to aliens.”96  After all, “aliens
are without meaningful voice in the political bargains struck
by a representative system.”97  This is precisely why many of the
earliest examples of international human rights law norms in-
volve the treatment of foreign naturals abroad.98
IV. CRITICISM OF DOMESTIC INCORPORATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW:  TWO DIFFERENT VIEWS OF THE
ROLE OF DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION
This Part of the Article explores in greater detail the duel-
ing democracy-related claims made by critics of domestic in-
93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 cmt. n
(1987) (identifying the prohibition torture or other cruel, inhuman, or de-
grading treatment or punishment as jus cogens).
94. Chander, supra note 19, at 1203 (applying Ely’s theory internation- R
ally); see also John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory:  Constitutional Theory and
Practice in a World Where Courts Are No Different from Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV.
833, 833 n.4 (1991).
95. Chander, supra note 19, at 1203 (translating John Hart Ely to the R
transnational law context); see also ELY, supra note 79, at 103. R
96. David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 981 (2002).
97. Id.
98. See LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 276-78 (1999) [hereinafter
HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS].
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corporation of international law in the two arenas where the
relationship between internationalism and constitutionalism
has been most fiercely contested.  These critics call for greater
democratic process as a prerequisite for the legitimacy of inter-
national law in the context of constitutional analysis, even
while some of these same critics reject the democratic process
as an impermissible encroachment on the President’s power
to wage war in the context of the War on Terror.  In analyzing
the claims made by critics in these two realms, this Part of the
Article demonstrates in further detail how we can understand
the varying positions taken in each as reflecting different per-
spectives on the requirements of democracy.
A. Criticism of Resort to International Law in
Constitutional Interpretation
Critics of domestic incorporation of international law
have argued for greater democratic process before courts can
resort to international and comparative law in interpreting the
Constitution.99  For these critics, judicial resort to interna-
tional law—even in the form of a binding ratified treaty—is
not true to our constitutional ideals of democratic accountabil-
ity, self-governance, and popular sovereignty without further
democratic deliberation.  Critics have expressed these con-
cerns in at least three ways.  First, they object that the process
of international lawmaking itself is undemocratic. The second
99. Note that criticism of the internalization of international norms by
U.S. courts goes beyond objections to the use of international law in consti-
tutional interpretation.  Critics raise many objections to the internalization
of international law based on its effects in constitutional or statutory inter-
pretation; in constraining what federal, state, or local governments can do;
or in preventing “the President and his subordinates from exercising other-
wise lawful discretionary authority.”  McGinnis & Somin, supra note 10, at R
1177.
Located on both ends of the political spectrum, right-wing and left-wing
critics object that international law could “subject this country to human
rights, labor, health, environmental, and military rules not of our own mak-
ing.”  Chander, supra note 19, at 1197.  “The targets of their ire are daz- R
zlingly broad, including the International Criminal Court, the International
Labor Organization, the Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Kyoto Proto-
col in Global Warming, [the World Trade Organization (WTO),] the United
Nations Human Rights Commission [ ], the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, nongovernmental organizations such as women’s groups, and corpo-
rate codes of conduct.” Id.
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and third concerns focus on the proper roles of each branch
of government in implementing international law.  The sec-
ond concern involves the claim that legislative and executive
branch incorporation of international law should go beyond
mere treaty ratification, which they see as insufficiently demo-
cratic.  Third is the objection that direct judicial incorporation
of international law suffers from a democratic deficit.  By call-
ing for greater democratic accountability in the form of Con-
gressional action to implement international standards, these
critics reflect the thick variant of the majoritarian conception
of democracy outlined in Part III above.
1. The Formation of International Law
The first concern is that the process of international law-
making itself is undemocratic.  According to the transnational
legal process approach, international law is made through a
fluid, dynamic process in which “public and private actors . . .
interact in a variety of . . . domestic and international fora to
make, interpret, enforce, and ultimately, internalize rules of
transnational law.”100  This view of international lawmaking is
non-statist in that “the actors in this process are not just, or
even primarily, nation-states, but include nonstate actors as
well.”101  Emphasizing the normativity of this account, Harold
Koh contends that “[f]rom this process of interaction, new
rules of law emerge, which are interpreted, internalized, and
enforced, thus beginning the process all over again.”  The
problem as far as critics are concerned is that “by admitting to,
and embracing the normativity of the transnational legal pro-
cess,” transnationalists “leave themselves even more vulnerable
100. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181,
183-84 (1996) [hereinafter Koh, Transnational Legal Process] (explaining how
international law is made through a transnational legal process, which “de-
scribes the theory and practice of how public and private actors—nation-
states, international organizations, multinational enterprises, non-govern-
mental organizations, and private individuals—interact in a variety of public
and private, domestic and international fora to make, interpret, enforce,
and ultimately, internalize rules of transnational law”).
101. Id. at 184 (noting further that “transnational law transforms, mutates,
and percolates up and down, from the public to the private, from the domes-
tic to the international level and back down again”).
\\server05\productn\N\NYI\40-3\NYI302.txt unknown Seq: 35 28-MAY-08 11:20
2008] TINKERING WITH TORTURE IN THE AFTERMATH OF HAMDAN 757
to the charge of hijacking democracy,” as “the task of identify-
ing the source of the norms remains elusive.”102
More specifically, the concern that the international law-
making process is undemocratic has two intertwined dimen-
sions—one relating to customary international law and the
other relating to treaties.
a. Customary International Law
Even where customary international law has not been “do-
mesticated” by the political process, part of the problem, ac-
cording to McGinnis and Somin, is the open-ended way in
which customary law rules are made.  Customary international
law is created when nation-states engage in a practice out of a
sense of legal obligation.103  While “the metric for . . . custom-
ary international law is objective, its objectivity does not mean
that determining the content of custom is straightforward.”104
The nub of the problem, as far as McGinnis and Somin
are concerned, is that because “[s]tate practices are multifari-
ous and often obscure,” “cataloguing them requires special ex-
pertise” and thus depends on “the authority of experts in cus-
tomary international law . . . to make such assessments.”105
These experts, they argue, are typically drawn from a group of
largely unrepresentative and politically unaccountable individ-
uals, namely law professors in the United States (who lean
“Democratic rather than Republican by a ratio of over five to
one”)106 and international law judges (who “can create more
power for themselves by expanding the scope of international
102. Chander, supra note 19, at 1200 (recounting this concern, though R
Chander himself is a self-proclaimed transnationalist); see also Mary Ellen
O’Connell, New International Legal Process, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 334, 338 (1999)
(“Koh does not himself elaborate on these questions [of what the values of
the system are] beyond indicating their importance to a methodology.”).
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 (1987) (re-
quiring widespread acceptance of a rule for it to be customary law).
104. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 10, at 1200; see also David J. Bet- R
terman, Constructivism, Positivism, and Empiricism in International Law, 89 GEO.
L. J. 469, 486 (2001) (reviewing ANTHONY C. AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTER-
NATIONAL SOCIETY (1999)) (“[C]ustomary international law has always been
quite elusive.  When is there sufficient state practice?  And when is there
sufficient opinio juris?”).
105. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 10, at 1200. R
106. Id. at 1202; see also Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seri-
ously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 58 n.3 (2007) (noting a disconnect in the
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law” and “thus have an institutional stake in a wider scope for
custom”).107
One response to this concern is that the domestic judges
asked to interpret this “raw international law” are smart people
able to assess the writings of scholars and international jurists
in a fair and balanced way.  Moreover, in light of “the Execu-
tive’s ability to provide its own view of international law
through letters and amicus briefs to the court and the exis-
tence of multiple viewpoints in academic writing, the likeli-
hood that judges will be misled by academics into erroneously
finding a cause of action in international law seems re-
mote.”108  Indeed, in the well-known Filartiga case, which held
the prohibition against torture to be a customary international
law norm, the executive branch filed an amicus brief in sup-
port of Dolly and Dr. Joel Filartiga’s efforts to get relief for the
torture of Joelito Filartiga.109
These critics also challenge the democratic legitimacy of
customary international law by objecting that it suffers from
the problem of the dead hand.  Because it “requires wide-
spread consensus among states, once formulated it is difficult
to change [and] locks old norms in place even if they are
dangerously suboptimal.”110  Yet this is a general problem with
any entrenched norm, including domestic constitutional
norms.111
immigration field between the views of immigration law scholars and those
of the public).
107. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 10, at 1204 (describing as undemo- R
cratic the method through which international law judges are typically ap-
pointed, which lacks the transparency of the U.S. federal judge nomination
and appointment process and includes judges from authoritarian govern-
ments); see also Paul B. Stephan, International Governance and American Democ-
racy, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 237, 238 (2000) (describing customary international
law as “a prefabricated system of rules and norms, constructed by a loose
alliance of like-minded academics and international law specialists through a
form of advocacy that involves no democratic checks”).
108. Chander, supra note 19, at 1210 (contending that critics “cannot R
point to a single case where judges were so misled”).
109. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Pe-
titioners, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980), 1980 WL
340146.
110. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 10, at 1209. R
111. Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1697, 1712 (1996).
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b. Treaties
Furthermore, these critics argue that treaties lack “serious
democratic bona fides” and therefore require greater domes-
tic democratic review.112  Treaties often result from negotia-
tions with nondemocratic governments.  Moreover, “even the
democratic nations that sign these treaties often do not apply
them of their own force to displace their own laws,” indicating
that the norms contained in them are what economists refer to
as “cheap talk.”113  Thus, critics argue, treaty norms are too
aspirational and vague to be given automatic effect.114  At bot-
tom, the argument reduces to this:
As treaties represent bargains between national gov-
ernments, we cannot be sure that democratic nations
would have agreed to all of the provisions if
nondemocratic governments were not present at the
bargaining table.  Thus, unlike the case where cus-
tomary international law is based on state practices
considered individually, . . . multilateral treaties will
contain norms that would have been rejected by the
democratic process if considered in their own
right.115
These concerns seem misguided as well.  Since ordinary
domestic legislation may also contain a package of norms that
were bargained for collectively rather than individually, this
does not distinguish treaties as any more undemocratic than
ordinary legislation.  Moreover, while critics of international
lawmaking, such as Justice Antonin Scalia, offer the “sixth-
grade civics lesson” view of American law as “the law made by
112. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 10, at 1207 (calling the use of treaties R
as evidence of customary international law a “double democracy deficit,”
since not only are the sources democratically illegitimate, but “the power to
interpret these documents is [also] lodged in an undemocratic and unrepre-
sentative elite”—the international judiciary).
113. Id. at 1204.  McGinnis and Somin point out that for economists,
“ ‘cheap’ talk is the opposite of costly signaling” and that “[t]here is much
less reason to believe that ratifying a treaty represents the real preferences of
the domestic polity if the members of the polity are not willing to have the
rules enforced against themselves.” Id. at 1204 n.139.
114. Id. at 1206.
115. Id. at 1204-05.
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the people’s democratically elected representatives,”116 the
fact is that “many forms of ‘American’ law are not made by
elected representatives,”117 including decisions of administra-
tive agencies and constitutional courts.118  Indeed, “many
sources that jurists legitimately rely upon in interpreting the
Constitution are not created through democratic decisionmak-
ing . . . . [such as] consideration of the common law, historical
sources, social science and scientific data, law and economics
theory, pragmatic policy concerns, and judge-made rules of
construction, including principles of stare decisis.”119
2. Legislative and Executive Branch Incorporation of
International Law
As a corollary to the argument that the formation of trea-
ties is undemocratic, a second concern about resort to interna-
tional law in constitutional analysis is that the incorporation of
treaties through ratification is not sufficiently democratic.
One criticism, made prominently by John Yoo, is of the fact
that treaties are made by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate, but not the House of Representatives,
which has no role in treaty ratification.120  As a result, Yoo ar-
116. Chander, supra note 19, at 1201 n.37, 1204 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez- R
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 751 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part)) (describing Scalia’s approach as providing a “sixth-grade civics
lesson”).
117. Cleveland, supra note 28, at 103. R
118. See, e.g., Kumm, supra note 18, at 15: R
On the one hand, . . . the emergence of the administrative state. . . .
in the first half of the 20th century has involved significant delega-
tion of regulatory authority to administrative institutions of various
kinds.  Whether an area of monetary policy, antitrust policy or envi-
ronment policy, many of the core decisions are no longer made by
[the legislative branch].  On the other hand, liberal constitutional
democracies have developed in the second half of the 20th century
to include constitutional courts with the authority to strike down laws
generated by the legislative process on grounds of constitutional
principle.
(emphasis in original).
119. Cleveland, supra note 28, at 103. R
120. JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE:  THE CONSTITUTION IN
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 224 (2005) [hereinafter YOO, THE POWERS OF
WAR AND PEACE].  Note that this claim builds on Yoo’s earlier work, which
made similar arguments. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution:
Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
\\server05\productn\N\NYI\40-3\NYI302.txt unknown Seq: 39 28-MAY-08 11:20
2008] TINKERING WITH TORTURE IN THE AFTERMATH OF HAMDAN 761
gues, treaties should be presumed non-enforceable in the
courts until Congress has indicated otherwise by implement-
ing legislation passed by both Houses.121  This theory is a clear
example of the thicker variant of the majoritarian conception
of democracy.
On this basis, Yoo argues that the doctrine that ratified
treaties are non-self-executing “promotes democratic govern-
ment in the lawmaking process by requiring the consent of the
most directly democratic part of the government, the House of
Representatives, before the nation can truly implement treaty
obligations at home.”122  On this view, treaties represent mere
aspirations and lack the force of law.123
The Constitution, of course, says otherwise.  The
Supremacy Clause explicitly states that ratified treaties are the
“supreme Law of the Land” on par with ordinary legislation.124
Further, in an early well-known case, the Supreme Court held
that treaties are “to be regarded . . . as equivalent to an act of
the legislature.”125  The constitutional text, statements made
by the framers, and Supreme Court precedent are strong evi-
dence for the traditional view that ratified treaties, with or
1955, 1961 (1999) (arguing that the view that treaties are automatically en-
forceable in courts is not consistent with the Framers’ notions of democratic
self-government and popular sovereignty); John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public
Law Making:  A Textual and Structural Defense of Nonexecution, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 2218 (1999) (asserting that constitutional text and structure require
implementation of treaty obligations by federal statute).
121. YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 120, at 224 (“Estab- R
lishing a process in which the House takes part through implementing legis-
lation provides yet another safeguard for popular sovereignty.”).
122. YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 120, at 224. R
123. See also McGinnis & Somin, supra note 10, at 1205-06 (indicating that R
“[a] nation’s decision to ratify [treaty] norms does not necessarily mean that
they intend to apply them to their own citizens”); Arthur M. Wiesburd, The
Significance and Determination of Customary International Human Rights Law:
The Effect of Treaties and Other Formal International Acts on the Customary Law of
Human Rights, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99, 134-36 (1996) (arguing that
human rights treaties generally lack true enforcement mechanisms, raising
doubts that states intend for them to have a legal character).
124. U.S. CONST. art. VI (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”).
125. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829).
\\server05\productn\N\NYI\40-3\NYI302.txt unknown Seq: 40 28-MAY-08 11:20
762 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 40:723
without implementing legislation, are binding law enforceable
in courts.126  Indeed, scholars have noted that a primary impe-
tus for convening the Constitutional Convention was the fail-
ure of state governments to enforce treaties.127  By making
treaties the “Law of the Land,” the Supremacy Clause solved
this problem.  Indeed, the framers unanimously decided not
to include treaty enforcement in Congress’s enumerated pow-
ers; doing so would have been “superfluous[,] since treaties
were to be ‘laws.’”128  As David Cole points out:
Yoo’s account turns that conclusion on its head; his
reading would render superfluous the Supremacy
Clause’s assertion that treaties are laws.  If treaties
had domestic force only when implemented by a sub-
sequent statute, as Yoo maintains, then the statute it-
self would have the status of the “Law of the Land,”
not the treaty.129
Admittedly, in recent years, the United States has fre-
quently attached declarations at the time of treaty ratification
specifying the treaty as non-self-executing:  that is, unenforce-
able until Congress has implemented it by means of ordinary
legislation.  Even without such instructions, courts are some-
126. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?:  Historical Scholarship, Origi-
nal Understanding, and Treaties as ‘Supreme Law of the Land,’ 99 COLUM. L. REV.
2095 (1999) (refuting Yoo’s argument on the status of treaties); Carlos Ma-
nuel Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (1999) (same);
see also Jack Rakove, Solving a Constitutional Puzzle:  The Treatymaking Clause as
a Case Study, in PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 233, 264 (Bernard Bailyn
et al. eds., 1984) (noting that the framers “were virtually of one mind when it
came to giving treaties the status of law”).
127. Henry Paul Monaghan, Article III and Supranational Judicial Review,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 853 & nn. 112-14 (2007); Wythe Holt, “To Establish
Justice”:  Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts,
1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1438-49, 1452 (1989) (providing a comprehensive ac-
count of the hostility of American states, mainly in the South, toward British
and Glasgow creditors before, during, and after the Revolutionary War and
pointing to state violations of the Jay Treaty as one of the reasons for the
Constitutional Convention of 1787); David Cole, What Bush Wants to Hear,
N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Nov. 17, 2005, at 10 (book review) [hereinafter Cole,
What Bush Wants to Hear].
128. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 389-90 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911).
129. Cole, What Bush Wants to Hear, supra note 127, at 10. R
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times inclined to find treaties not enforceable.130  Yoo would
take the additional step of creating a presumption against en-
forceability in the absence of implementing legislation passed
by both houses of Congress.131
Even if this criticism were not flawed, which I dispute, in
the torture context, Congress has passed legislation—enacted
by both the House and Senate—implementing the anti-torture
protections found in ratified treaties.  These statutory anti-tor-
ture protections are, thus, not vulnerable to criticism based on
the legislative ratification of treaty law.  I discuss this below in
Part IV.B.
3. Direct Judicial Incorporation of International Law
The third complaint is that direct judicial incorporation
of international law suffers from a democratic deficit.  Curtis
Bradley and Jack Goldsmith, for example, object to what they
call the “modern position” on customary international law.132
They argue that the view that customary law has the domestic
legal status of federal common law is inconsistent with basic
understandings regarding American representative democ-
racy, federal common law, separation of powers, and federal-
ism.  As such, these critics conclude that courts should not ap-
130. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (finding,
inter alia, that Hamdan’s claim under the Geneva conventions was non-self-
executing), rev’d on other grounds, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
131. For more extensive criticism of this, see Cole, What Bush Wants to
Hear, supra note 127, at 10; Cass Sunstein, The 9/11 Constitution, NEW REPUB- R
LIC, Jan. 16, 2006, at 4 (book review).
132. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith III, Customary International Law
as Federal Common Law:  A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV.
815 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law];
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith III, The Current Illegitimacy of Interna-
tional Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319 (1997); see also Phillip
R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV.
665 (1986); A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases,
20 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (1995); cf. Curtis Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and
Separation of Powers:  Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86
GEO. L.J. 479, 524-32 (1998) (arguing that extending the “Charming Betsy”
canon from statutory interpretation—where there is a presumption of con-
sistency of statutes with international law—to constitutional interpretation is
problematic, because the canon rests on the separation of powers considera-
tions and its application to the constitutional interpretation would deprive
the political branches of the opportunity to decide whether they want to
violate international law).
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ply customary law as federal law unless expressly authorized to
do so by the President and Congress through legislation.
Again, this reflects the thicker variant of the majoritarian con-
ception of democracy.
Other scholars see Bradley and Goldsmith’s argument as
revisionist, noting that the view that customary international
law has the status of federal common law is neither “modern”
nor inconsistent with the founders’ visions of democracy, sepa-
ration of powers, and federalism.  As Harold Koh pointedly
states:  “Every schoolchild knows that the failures of the Arti-
cles of Confederation led to the framing of the Constitution,
which established national governmental institutions to articu-
late uniform positions on such uniquely federal matters as for-
eign affairs and international law.”133  Koh’s view finds support
in the post-Erie jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, which has
continued to “recogniz[e] the need and authority . . . to for-
mulate what has come to be known as ‘federal common law’”
in areas where “a federal rule of decision is ‘necessary to pro-
tect uniquely federal interests,’” such as “international dis-
putes implicating . . . our relations with foreign nations.”134
Though history and precedent fail to support their posi-
tion, Bradley and Goldsmith ultimately argue that allowing
judges to apply international law is normatively undemocratic:
Unelected federal judges apply customary interna-
tional law made by the world community at the ex-
pense of state prerogatives.  In this context, of
course, the interests of the states are neither formally
133. Koh, International Law, supra note 33, at 1825 (“As so often happens, R
the hornbook rule—international law, as applied in the United States, must
be federal law—makes obvious sense.”); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and
Nonsense About Customary International Law:  A Response to Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997) [hereinafter Neuman, Sense and
Nonsense]; Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land:  Customary International Law
as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393 (1997); Ryan Goodman &
Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga’s Firm Footing:  International Human Rights and Federal
Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (1997).
134. Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640-41 (1981)
(quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964));
see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 692 (2004) (affirming that
customary international law has some standing as federal law).
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nor effectively represented in the lawmaking pro-
cess.135
In a sense, this is an international variation of Alexander
Bickel’s classic countermajoritarian concern regarding judicial
review.136  Bradley and Goldsmith echo Bickel’s complaint that
judicial review violates principles of democratic self-govern-
ance by displacing the majoritarian decisions of the people, as
represented by their elected officials, with the views of
unelected, unrepresentative, and unaccountable judges.  Jus-
tice Clarence Thomas has likewise complained that “[w]hile
Congress, as the legislature, may wish to consider the actions
of other nations on any issue it likes, this Court’s . . . jurispru-
dence should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on
Americans.”137  Gerald Neuman has tried to address this con-
cern about customary international law by pointing out that
judicial enforcement of international law as federal common
law “can be overturned by Congress.”138  However, when
judges resort to international law to interpret the Constitution,
the decision cannot be overturned by the legislature.  At the
same time, constitutional analysis relying on international law
“is no more, or less, countermajoritarian than any other.”139
135. Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 132, at R
868.
136. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 92 (1962) (“The people of a democracy must
be mercifully soothed when they find themselves ruled, to whatever extent,
by the nine men of the Supreme Court.”); see also Chander, supra note 19, at R
1194-96; Cleveland, supra note 28, at 101-02. R
137. Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in de-
nial of certiorari).
138. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense, supra note 133, at 383-84. But see Ste- R
phan, supra note 116, at 247 (suggesting that it may be futile to rely on Con-
gress to overturn judicial common-lawmaking since “the enactment of legis-
lation is a cumbersome and costly process, more likely than not to be incom-
plete”).  Ultimately, “[t]he issue reduces to the setting of the default rule—
should courts apply customary international law in Alien Tort Statute cases
or refuse to do so in the absence of congressional incorporation of the inter-
national law norm into national law?”  Chander, supra note 19, at 1207 R
(referencing Neuman, Sense and Nonsense, supra note 133, at 84). R
139. Cleveland, supra note 28, at 101 (“[T]o the extent that the Constitu- R
tion imposes limits on legislative decisionmaking through individual rights
provisions and the structures of federalism and separation of powers, judicial
enforcement of those rights and relationships is necessarily nonmajoritarian.
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Furthermore, acknowledging that constitutional analysis
as a general matter is somewhat countermajoritarian does not
concede that it is also undemocratic, whether it involves inter-
national law or otherwise.  As John Hart Ely famously ex-
plained, constitutional protections for individual rights and
the judiciary’s independence from direct politics were inten-
tionally designed as a bulwark against raw majoritarianism.140
Judicial review is thus “justified as democracy enhancing if it
serves to protect discrete and insular minorities.”141  The de-
mocracy-enhancing role of judicial review has been echoed by
other scholars, primarily in the context of domestic public law
litigation.  For example, Abram Chayes notes in his ground-
breaking work that public law litigation enriches the institu-
tional repertory of our democracy, because courts are less sus-
ceptible to capture than legislatures or regulatory agencies.142
The Filartiga case143 shows the judiciary’s role in safe-
guarding rights where the political branches cannot due to in-
terest group capture or simply because they lack the institu-
tional competence.  The defendant, Americo Norberto Pena-
Irala, had been accused of torturing Joel Filartiga in Peru.
Pena-Irala relocated to the United States and sought asylum.
While the Executive’s primary choice was either to deport
Pena-Irala or grant him asylum, the courts were further able to
consider the Filartiga family’s torture claim.  The Alien Tort
Claims Act gave them this opening by providing district courts
with jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States.”  However, the statute does not specify
which customary norms constitute the “law of nations.”  Critics
of customary law have therefore claimed that “customary law”
for the statute’s purposes should be confined to those norms
already established when the Alien Tort Claims Act was in-
Courts [thus] engage in constitutional analysis with caution, since their deci-
sions bind the political branches.”).
140. ELY, supra note 79, at 130-31. R
141. Chander, supra note 19, at 1203.  Chander also observes that “Ely R
deftly turns insulation from the political process from a vice to a virtue.” Id.
at 1196.
142. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1281 (1976).
143. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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cluded as part of the First Judiciary Act in 1789,144 particularly
in the absence of more contemporary enactments by Con-
gress.145
In sum, in calling for greater democratic accountability in
the various ways summarized here, critics of resort to interna-
tional and comparative law in constitutional interpretation re-
flect the thick variant of the majoritarian conception of democ-
racy.
B. Criticism of Resort to International Law to Constrain
Presidential Power in the War on Terror
As we have seen, in one arena—federal courts—critics of
domestic incorporation of international law have argued for
greater democratic process before courts can look to interna-
tional and comparative law to interpret the Constitution.
However, in another arena—the executive branch—some of
the same critics have argued for less democratic process in the
treatment of international law in the President’s War on Ter-
ror.  In fact, some critics assert that the President may disre-
gard domestic laws incorporating international law such as, for
example, legislation implementing and validating the interna-
tional prohibition on torture.  These critics bristle at efforts to
apply international law constraints—even treaty norms not
only ratified but implemented into legislation by both houses of
144. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 749-50 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).   A majority of the Supreme
Court has rejected this view, though the Court has been careful to establish
criteria for assessing what customary norms may come within the ambit of
the Act. Id. at 747-48 (explaining that the norms that may constitute custom-
ary norms for the purposes of the Alien Torts Claims Act must have con-
creteness and enjoy widespread consensus).
145. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork, J., concurring in per curiam opinion), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003
(1985) (“Under the possible meaning I have sketched, section 1350’s cur-
rent function would be quite modest, unless a modern statute, treaty, or ex-
ecutive agreement provided a private cause of action for violations of new
international norms which do not themselves contemplate private enforce-
ment.  Then, at least, we would have a current political judgment about the
role appropriate for courts in an area of considerable international sensitiv-
ity.”).  To resolve any doubt, Congress responded to Judge Bork’s concern
by updating the Alien Torts Claims Act in enacting the Torture Victim Pro-
tection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 note (Torture Victim Protection) (2000)).
\\server05\productn\N\NYI\40-3\NYI302.txt unknown Seq: 46 28-MAY-08 11:20
768 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 40:723
Congress, which can hardly be said to suffer from a democracy
deficit.  In this case, the objection is that application of such
norms would impermissibly infringe on the President’s power
to wage war as Commander-in-Chief.  This approach reflects
the thinner variant of the majoritarian conception of democ-
racy, which, as discussed above in Part III, asserts that the Pres-
ident, as the people’s elected representative, should be able to
unilaterally do what he wants to do in, for example, his War on
Terror—even when this means disregarding statutes regulat-
ing how the executive branch can treat detainees.
Not surprisingly, many of these critics are current or for-
mer executive branch counsel.  In fact, across administrations,
executive branch lawyers have argued for broad executive au-
thority;146 neither party has a monopoly on this position.
However, as I will discuss, lawyers for the Bush Administration
have pursued these arguments with unprecedented zeal.
In discussing the role of each branch of government in
implementing international law norms that constrain U.S.
treatment of detainees, this Section loosely tracks the previous
Section.  However, this Section focuses on how the thinner vari-
ant of the majoritarian conception of democracy leads to the
claim that less democratic review is warranted in the treatment
of international law in the War on Terror generally and in the
context of the use of torture specifically.  In the first Subsec-
tion below, I discuss Congressional implementation of the in-
ternational law prohibition on torture.  In the second Subsec-
146. For example, Walter Dellinger, the head of the Justice Department
Office of Legal Counsel under President Clinton, supported the use of presi-
dential signing statements to justify nonenforcement by the President of stat-
utes that were clearly unconstitutional.  17 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 131, 132-
34 (1993); 18 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 199, 199 (1994).
However, Dellinger says that the problem with the Bush Administra-
tion’s signing statements is that some of his constitutional views are funda-
mentally wrong.  Walter Dellinger, Op-Ed., A Slip of the Pen, N.Y. TIMES, July
31, 2006, at 17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/31/opinion/
31Dellinger.html?_r=1&oref=slogin.Further, noting that senior Bush Admin-
istration officials are citing the 1994 memorandum Dellinger wrote establish-
ing a legal basis for signing statements, Dellinger argues that these officials
“largely ignore the memo’s cautionary guidelines.” Id.  “The Bush adminis-
tration’s frequent and seemingly cavalier refusal to enforce laws, which is
aggravated by avoidance of judicial review and even public disclosure of its
actions, places it at odds with [the principles outlined in the Dellinger
memo] and with predecessors of both parties.” Id.
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tion, I explore the methods the executive branch has used to
undermine the democratic basis of these international stan-
dards.  These include secret legal memos justifying the use of
torture (the “torture memos”) and the use of presidential sign-
ing statements.  Beyond supporting an expansive view of exec-
utive power, these methods are themselves designed to
squelch democratic debate.  In the third Subsection, I ex-
amine the judiciary’s firm rebuff in the Hamdan decision of
the Executive’s claims of permissible unilateralism in the con-
text of military commissions.  Here, the Article considers the
relevance of the Court’s decision for the torture debate and
democracy.
1. Congressional Efforts that Deepen the Democratic Basis of
International Law
Before Congress ever explicitly considered it, the prohibi-
tion on torture had been established variously as a customary
norm,147 an aspect of jus cogens,148 and a provision of numer-
ous treaties, including treaties ratified by the United States.149
Long before Hamdan, Congress as a whole deepened the dem-
ocratic basis of the international prohibition on torture by im-
plementing it in domestic legislation.  This domestication
helped fulfill U.S. obligations found in previously ratified trea-
ties requiring legislation criminalizing torture.  For example,
Congress implemented the anti-torture protections found in
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 through the enactment of
the War Crimes Act.150  Before the Military Commissions Act
amended it, the War Crimes Act criminalized all violations of
Common Article 3 (common to all four Geneva Conventions)
as war crimes.151  Among other things, Common Article 3 pro-
147. See, e.g., Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876.
148. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 cmt. n
(1987) (identifying torture prohibition as jus cogens norm).
149. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85,
23 I.L.M. 1027, as modified by 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985) [hereinafter Convention
Against Torture]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23,
1976).  Note that the provisions of article 41 (interstate complaints) of the
ICCPR entered into force on March 28, 1979.
150. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2001).
151. For changes wrought by the Military Commissions Act, see the discus-
sion infra Part IV.
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hibits inhumane treatment, “cruel treatment and torture,” and
“outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment.”152  Further, Congress implemented the
anti-torture protections found in the Convention against Tor-
ture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (“Torture Convention”) through enactment of
the Federal Torture Statute.153  While ratification of the Ge-
neva Conventions and Torture Convention (as well as of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) gave the
international torture prohibition a democratic imprimatur,
the War Crimes Act and Federal Torture Statute represent ad-
ditional “democracy moments” for the prohibition.154
In the face of these explicitly democratic legislative efforts
to reaffirm the international prohibition on torture, executive
branch lawyers have made a series of arguments to claim that
application of these laws to the President would unconstitu-
tionally encroach on his power to wage war as Commander-in-
Chief.  Not only did executive branch officials advance the po-
sition that legislation criminalizing torture could be dis-
152. See, e.g., Third Geneva Convention, supra note 6, art. 3.  The Third R
Geneva Convention requires that governments “undertake to enact any leg-
islation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons commit-
ting, or ordering to be committed . . . grave breaches of the present Conven-
tion.” Id. art. 129.  Among other things, grave breaches include “torture or
inhuman treatment,” “willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to
body or health,” or “willfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair
and regular trial prescribed in this Convention.” Id. art. 130.  As for other
violations (so-called “nongrave” breaches), the Third Geneva Convention
further provides that governments “shall take measures necessary for the
suppression of all acts contrary to the [other] provisions of the present Con-
vention.” Id. art. 129.  Such violations include, inter alia, “cruel treatment”
and “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrad-
ing treatment.” Id. art. 3(a), (c).  For further discussion and criticism of the
distinction between grave and “nongrave” breaches—particularly as this dis-
tinction is made in the Military Commissions Act—see infra Part IV.
153. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2006).  The Convention Against Torture requires
that “[e]ach State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences
under its criminal law.”  Convention Against Torture, supra note 149, art. 4. R
154. Note that while the United States has ratified the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, which prohibits torture as well as cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, Congress has not passed
implementing legislation as regards these treaty obligations.  Nonetheless, as
a ratified treaty, it is federal law under the Supremacy Clause of the federal
Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. VI; see supra Part III.A.2 (discussing this
point).
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counted, but they moreover took this stance secretly through
internal memos or quietly through a presidential signing state-
ment rather than more publicly (for example, through veto).
In this sense, the White House position on torture suffers from
a “double democracy deficit”:  It resists international norms
democratically implemented through legislation, and it dis-
plays this resistance largely behind closed doors rather than
exposing it to the sunlight of democratic debate.155  We can
understand this position as reflecting the thin majoritarian
conception of democracy.
2. Executive Branch Efforts to Undermine Anti-Torture
Protections:  Tools for Tinkering
The different positions taken by critics of international
law in the context of constitutional analysis on the one hand,
and the War on Terror on the other, turn on conflicting con-
ceptions of the requirements of democracy in implementing
international law domestically.156  The underlying subtext in
155. I borrow the phrase “double democracy deficit” from McGinnis and
Somin, who use it, by contrast, to describe what they perceive to be the dem-
ocratic illegitimacy of customary international law.  McGinnis & Somin,
supra note 10, at 1207. R
156. A related topic that is beyond the scope of this Article is whether the
President has authority to violate international law more generally.  For an
excellent discussion of this, see Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President
Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97, 154-57 (2004).  Vio-
lating international law is distinct from a President’s decision to withdraw
from the treaty.  “For treaty withdrawals—at least withdrawals that are valid
under international law—the conventional view is that the President may act
without the approval of Congress.”  Larry R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L.
REV. 1579, 1590 n.25 (2005); see also Jinks & Sloss, supra, at 154-57 (distin-
guishing between treaty withdrawals and treaty violations when analyzing the
President’s authority under the Constitution and concluding that “[a]s long
as a presidential decision to suspend, terminate, or withdraw from a treaty
complies with international law, the President’s action is consistent with his
constitutional duty to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’”);
Joshua P. O’Donnell, Note, The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Debate:  Time for
Some Clarification of the President’s Authority to Terminate a Treaty, 35 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1601, 1625 (2002) (“The most widely-held modern view on
the topic is that the President has the authority to terminate treaties, but it is
still a highly controversial topic.” (internal quotations omitted)); Goldwater
v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (holding on political question grounds in
challenge brought by congressional representatives against President
Carter’s termination of a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan in accordance
with the treaty’s termination clause that there is no judicially enforceable
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these varying positions is that war—particularly this war–—is
different.  Emphasizing the structural advantages of the execu-
tive branch in swift decisionmaking and readier access to infor-
mation,157 supporters of this view argue for expansive and
often unilateral executive authority in times of war and, thus,
constitutional constraint that precludes the President from exercising a
treaty termination clause unilaterally (i.e., without a congressional vote) on
the basis of his Article II powers).
157. Summarizing arguments made by critics, Mark Tushnet notes:
The executive branch is nominally unified under the President,
and so can develop a single position, whereas Congress has many
members who seek to advance both a general view and more paro-
chial interests.  The President has readier access to relevant infor-
mation than Congress does, and can keep the information secret
even from Congress.  Finally, the President can act quickly, whereas
Congress takes time to deliberate and enact legislation.
Tushnet, supra note 8, at 1470 (citing ERIC POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TER- R
ROR IN THE BALANCE:  SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 170 (2007)); see
also POSNER & VERMEULE, supra, at 170 (including among the “institutional
disadvantages” of Congress a “lack of information about what is happening”
and an “inability to act quickly and with one voice”); id. at 170
(“[C]ongressional deliberation is slow and unsuited for emergencies.  Con-
gress has trouble keeping secrets and is always vulnerable to obstructionism
at the behest of members of Congress who place the interests of their con-
stituents ahead of those of the nation as a whole.”); United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Ex. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (noting that in foreign affairs,
the President “has his confidential sources of information”); Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2823 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasiz-
ing that “the structural advantages attendant to the executive branch—
namely, the decisiveness, ‘activity, secrecy, and dispatch’ that flow from the
Executive’s ‘unity’ . . . led the Founders to conclude that the ‘President
ha[s] primary responsibility—along with the necessary power—to protect
the national security and to conduct the nation’s foreign relations”). But see
Mark Tushnet, The Political Constitution of Emergency Powers:  Some Lessons from
Hamdan, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1451, 1470 (2007), in which Tushnet speculates:
One might wonder, though, about whether these characteristics
give the President much of an advantage over Congress, except in
the very short run.  It is easy to exaggerate the unity within the
executive:  It is part of the folk-lore of Washington, for example,
that the Department of State and the Department of Defense are
regularly at odds over the proper response to external threats.
Leaks from within the executive bureaucracy are common, and not
always at the behest of the President.  Specialized committees and
their professional staff members can over time acquire expertise
and information equivalent to, or exceeding, that of the President’s
political appointees and employees in the executive bureaucracy.
Congress can organize itself to engage in real-time oversight of ex-
ecutive operations, and at least has attempted to do so by requiring
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for the thin majoritarian conception of democracy.  This view
has been advanced to support presidential power even in the
face of Congressional limitations in various aspects of the War
on Terror, including the use of warrantless wiretapping and
the detention and treatment of terrorism suspects.  Moreover,
by arguing that the War on Terror has no geographic or tem-
poral boundaries, critics argue that the framework developed
in Justice Robert Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer158 does not apply.  These claims were made
in (1) internal “torture memos” written by executive branch
lawyers to secretly justify executive authority to use coercive
interrogation techniques on detainees159 and (2) a presiden-
tial signing statement limiting the reach of legislation concern-
ing treatment of detainees.
a. The Torture Memos
Here I focus on two of the torture memos.  The first, by
Jay S. Bybee (“Bybee Opinion”), then-Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), concerns imple-
mentation of the Federal Torture Statute and U.S. obligations
under the Torture Convention.160  The second, by John Yoo
(“Yoo Opinion”), then-Deputy Assistant Attorney General of
OLC, concerns implementation of the War Crimes Act and
U.S. obligations under the Geneva Conventions.161  Opinions
that the President notify a select group of congressional leaders
[the so-called “gang of Eight”] of some operations.
158. 343 U.S. 579 (1952); see infra Part III.B.4.
159. The “torture memos” became public only when they were eventually
leaked to the press.  For a collection of these memos, see THE TORTURE PA-
PERS, supra note 7. See generally MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH: R
AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2004).
160. Memorandum from Jay Bybee, Ass’t Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re-
garding Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-
2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/nytimes/docs/
doj/bybee80102mem.pdf [hereinafter Bybee Opinion].  In fact, this memo-
randum was “also written by [John] Yoo . . . but it was signed by Mr. Bybee
and for several years has been commonly known as the Bybee memo.”  Mark
Mazzetti, ’03 U.S. Memo Approved Harsh Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2,
2008, at A1.
161. Note too that another Office of Legal Counsel attorney, Robert J.
Delahunty, assisted with this Opinion.  Memorandum from John Yoo, Dep-
uty Ass’t Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel and Rob-
ert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to William J. Haynes
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provided by the Justice Department’s OLC determine authori-
tatively the executive branch’s legal position on non-litigation
matters.162
i. The Bybee Opinion
The August 1, 2002 Bybee memorandum opinion, sent to
then-Counsel to the President Alberto R. Gonzales, addressed
standards of conduct for interrogation.  Apparently in re-
sponse to a request from White House Counsel Gonzales, the
Bybee Opinion seeks to answer whether U.S. officials can use
tactics tantamount to torture against terrorism suspects with-
out being held criminally responsible under the Federal Tor-
ture Statute.
The legal analysis contained in the Bybee Opinion is
flawed in several respects.  As others have discussed in greater
detail,163 this Opinion uses an “absurdly narrow definition of
torture.”164  Moreover, the Bybee Opinion asserts a number of
excuses, including presidential war powers, self-defense, and
the defense of necessity, which “ignore the absolute nature of
the ban on torture in the Torture Conventions Article 2, as
well as the legitimate scope of self-defense and necessity under
international law.”165
For the purposes of this Article, the most significant way
in which the Bybee Opinion distorts the law is by using a thin
II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def., Regarding Application of Treaties and Laws
to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 9, 2002) [hereinafter Yoo Opinion],
reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 7, at 38.  While I discuss the Yoo R
Opinion second, it is chronologically first when compared to the Bybee
Opinion.
162. For a discussion of the proper role of the Office of Legal Counsel,
see Harold Hongju Koh, Protecting the Office of Legal Counsel from Itself, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 513 (1993); Dawn Johnsen, Guidelines for the President’s Legal
Advisors, 81 IND. L.J. 1345 (2006).
163. See, e.g., Jose´ E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.
175 (2006); Harold Hongju Koh, Can the President Be Torturer in Chief?, 81
IND. L.J 1145 (2006) [hereinafter Koh, Torturer-in-Chief]; Waldron, supra note
13, at 1681. R
164. Koh, Torturer-in-Chief, supra note 163, at 1150. R
165. Alvarez, supra note 163, at 183-84 (citing, inter alia, Convention R
Against Torture, supra note 149, art. 2(2) (stating that “[n]o exceptional R
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal
political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justi-
fication for torture”)).
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majoritarian view of democracy to conclude that legislation
criminalizing torture simply does not apply to the President or
his subordinates in interrogating suspected terrorists.  The
Opinion claims that “[a]ny effort by Congress to regulate the
interrogation of battlefield combatants would violate the Con-
stitution’s sole vesting of the Commander-in-Chief authority in
the President.”166  Asserting that “[o]ne of the core functions
of the Commander in Chief is that of capturing, detaining,
and interrogating members of the enemy,”167 the Opinion
contends that “Congress lacks authority under Article I to set
the terms and conditions under which the President may exer-
cise his authority as Commander in Chief to control the con-
duct of operations during a war.”168  By claiming that even sub-
ordinates cannot be prosecuted for torture if they were “carry-
ing out the President’s Commander-in-Chief powers,” the
Bybee Opinion concludes that these officials cannot be pun-
ished under the Federal Torture Statute for “aiding the Presi-
dent in exercising his exclusive constitutional authorities.”169
As one observer has noted, “[we are left with the conclusion
that] the Constitution licenses the President to be ‘torturer in
chief.’”170
In fact, in the area of foreign affairs and warfare, Con-
gress has substantial authority that it shares with the President.
“On its face, the Constitution divides power over foreign af-
fairs.”171  Congress has power “to provide for the common De-
166. Bybee Opinion, supra note 160, at 39; see also id. at 34: R
In order to respect the President’s inherent constitutional author-
ity to manage military campaign against al Qaeda and its allies, [the
Federal Torture Statute] must be construed as not applying to in-
terrogations undertaken pursuant to his Commander-in-Chief au-
thority.
167. Id. at 38.
168. Id. at 34-35.
169. Id. at 35.
170. Koh, Torturer-in-Chief, supra note 163, at 1151. R
171. Cole, What Bush Wants to Hear, supra note 127, at 8; see also Ingrid B. R
Wuerth, International Law and Constitutional Interpretation:  The Commander-in-
Chief Clause Reconsidered, 106 MICH. L. REV., at 9-10 (forthcoming 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=988509 (“This analysis shows that the
Constitution deliberately gave Congress control over the development and
interpretation of important war-related questions of international law, even
at the expense of the President’s power to control strategic decisions around
the deployment of force.”).
\\server05\productn\N\NYI\40-3\NYI302.txt unknown Seq: 54 28-MAY-08 11:20
776 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 40:723
fense”;172 to raise and regulate the military;173 to define “Of-
fenses against the Law of Nations”;174 to regulate international
commerce;175 to “declare War”;176 to “grant Letters of Marque
and Reprisal” (authorizing lesser forms of conflict);177 to
“make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval Forces”;178 and, significantly, to “make Rules con-
cerning Captures on Land and Water.”179  Furthermore, Con-
gress has power to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution . . . all . . . Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or
in any Department or Officer thereof.”180  Pursuant to these
sources of authority, Congress has enacted, for example, the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which prohibits tor-
ture of interrogatees.181
Certainly, the Commander-in-Chief power grants the Pres-
ident “the supreme command and direction of the military
and naval forces.”182  This clause recognizes the need for the
President to exercise unified control over the armed forces,
particularly with regard to battlefield operations.  But the
power to regulate the treatment of wartime detainees is shared
between the legislative and executive branches.  Unfortunately
for those who insist on a strong executive in wartime and are
thus cynical about both international law and the role of Con-
gress in incorporating international law constraints on execu-
tive action, “the framers held precisely the opposite views.”183
As David Cole points out, the framers “were intensely wary of
executive power,” particularly in light of their experience with
172. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
173. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 12, 13, 14.
174. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
175. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
176. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
177. Id.
178. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
179. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (emphasis added).
180. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
181. Koh, Torturer-in-Chief, supra note 163, at 1157.  Koh notes that “[i]n R
1950, Congress passed the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) in or-
der to ensure fairness and openness in the trials and treatment of military
defendants.” Id. at 1157 n.60.
182. THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
183. Cole, What Bush Wants to Hear, supra note 127, at 8. R
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the British monarch.184  Thus, they wanted to place more con-
straints—not fewer—on the decision to go to war.  Further-
more, “as leaders of a new and vulnerable nation, they were
eager to ensure that the mutual obligations they had negoti-
ated with other countries would be honored and enforced.”185
A subsequent legal opinion issued in 2004 by Daniel
Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, OLC, withdrew the
Bybee Opinion.186  However, although the Levin Opinion
withdrew the Bybee Opinion, it did not formally repudiate its
reasoning.  As Koh points out, “[i]nformally, [Levin’s with-
drawal] stated only that [Bybee’s] reasoning was unnecessary
and left open the question whether the withdrawal was
prompted because the reasoning was wrong or because it was
not necessary for the purpose of the original opinion.”187
ii. The Yoo Opinion
Like the Bybee Opinion, the Yoo Opinion of January 9,
2002 asserts the thin majoritarian view of democracy; this time,
the focus is on the Geneva Conventions and War Crimes Act.
The Yoo Opinion concludes that the pertinent provisions con-
cerning interrogation techniques in the Third and Fourth Ge-
neva Conventions do not apply to Al Qaeda or Taliban detain-
ees as a matter of law and that the President’s interpretation of
the applicability of treaties is decisive.188  As scholars have
noted of Yoo’s determination that the Geneva Conventions do
not apply:
[T]hese overbroad determinations ignore the differ-
ences between regular and irregular forces under Ar-
ticle 4 (A) (1) and (2) of Geneva III, the plain mean-
ing of Common Article 3, and the Article 5 require-
ment in Geneva III that in cases of doubt,
determinations of Prisoner of War (‘‘POW’’) status
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, to James B. Comey, Deputy Att’y Gen.,
Regarding Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, at 2
(Dec. 30, 2004), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/
gonzales/memos_dir/levin-memo-123004.pdf.
187. Koh, Torturer-in-Chief, supra note 163, at 1151. R
188. Yoo Opinion, supra note 161, at 39-59. R
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need to be made by a competent tribunal and not by
the President acting alone.189
Even in cases in which the Geneva Conventions do apply
to detainees, the Yoo Opinion claims that broad-based execu-
tive authority prevent their application where it would con-
strain the President.  Similar to the Bybee Opinion, the Yoo
Opinion denigrates the role of Congress in this process, assert-
ing:
[The President’s] foreign affairs power is indepen-
dent of Congress:  it is ‘the very delicate, plenary and
exclusive power of the President as an organ of the
federal government in the field of international rela-
tions—a power which does not require as a basis for
its exercise an Act of Congress. . . .  Part of the Presi-
dent’s plenary power over the conduct of the nation’s
foreign relations is the interpretation of treaties and
of international law.190
Yoo expands on this view in a recent book in which he
argues that because foreign policy is an executive prerogative,
the President has the unilateral power to interpret (and rein-
terpret) treaties.191  In a review of Yoo’s book, David Cole per-
suasively maintains:
[W]hile the Constitution plainly envisions the Presi-
dent as the principal negotiator of treaties, it also
gave clear responsibilities for treaties to the other
branches; all treaties must be approved by two-thirds
of the Senate, and once ratified, treaties become
“law” enforceable by the courts.  The President must
certainly be able to interpret treaties in order to “exe-
cute” the laws, just as he must be able to interpret
189. Alvarez, supra note 163, at 180 (summarizing criticism of the Yoo R
Opinion).
190. Yoo Opinion, supra note 161, at 52; see also YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR R
AND PEACE, supra note 120, at 225; JOHN C. YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS:  AN R
INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR (2006) (arguing that the Consti-
tution grants the President the lead role in foreign affairs and that other
branches should defer to the executive in wartime); John Yoo, Op-Ed., How
the Presidency Regained Its Balance, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2006, at A4, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/17/opinion/17yoo.html (claiming that
“the inescapable fact is that war shifts power to the branch most responsible
for its waging:  the executive”).
191. YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 120, at 190-214. R
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statutes for that purpose.  But there is no reason why
his interpretations of treaty should be any more bind-
ing on courts or the legislature than his interpreta-
tions of statutes.192
The Yoo Opinion likewise makes extravagant claims re-
garding customary international law, which also prohibits tor-
ture.  Relying on the scholarship of Curtis Bradley and Jack
Goldsmith, the Opinion describes the mainstream view—that
customary international law has the status of federal law—as
“seriously mistaken.”193  This claim is made despite acknowl-
edgment of the Supreme Court’s famous passage in the Pa-
quete Habana case that “international law is our law.”194  At the
same time, the Yoo Opinion ignores the fact that regardless of
the status of customary international law, Congress has imple-
mented the customary international law prohibition on tor-
ture through a variety of federal statutes.195  While the Yoo
opinion acknowledges in passing that the Constitution gives
Congress the power to “define and punish . . . offenses against
the Law of Nations,” he incorrectly uses this constitutional
hook to argue that customary international law is not federal
law until Congress acts.196
Moreover, the Yoo Opinion advances the controversial
position that “any presidential decision in the current conflict
concerning the detention and trial of Al Qaeda or Taliban mi-
litia prisoners would constitute a ‘controlling’ executive act
that would immediately and completely override any custom-
192. Cole, What Bush Wants to Hear, supra note 127, at 10. R
193. Yoo Opinion, supra note 161, at 71 n.108 (relying on Bradley & Gold- R
smith, Customary International Law, supra note 132, along with other revision- R
ist scholars). But see id. (citing to the mainstream literature rebutting the
Bradley and Goldsmith argument); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW § 111 cmt. 3 (1987) (“[T]he modern view is that customary inter-
national law in the United States is federal law.”); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 752 (2004) (affirming that customary international law has
some standing as federal law). See also infra Part III.A.3.
194. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (referring to custom-
ary international law as federal law).
195. Besides the Federal Torture Statute and War Crimes Act (discussed
supra), Congress has also passed the Torture Victim Protection Act, which
provides a right of action in U.S. courts to sue individuals that, under au-
thority of a foreign nation, violate the prohibition on torture.  Torture Vic-
tim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
196. Yoo Opinion, supra note 161, at 71. R
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ary international norms.”197  Other scholars have shown this
claim to be contestable in light of Supreme Court precedent
and historical practice.198  The notion that a controlling exec-
utive act can supersede customary international law seems
most problematic and undemocratic (reflecting at best the
thin majoritarian democratic idea) when Congress has acted
to implement the customary norm, as it has done with prohibi-
tion on torture.
b. Presidential Signing Statements
In this Subsection, I examine President Bush’s well-known
practice of issuing signing statements.199  Several signing state-
197. Id. at 74.
198. Alvarez argues that this proposition is at odds with the Paquete Ha-
bana case, noting:
[T]he famous passage in that judgment “where there is no treaty,
and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision,”
has been interpreted either as stating that customary international
law necessarily gives way to a “controlling executive act,” or is
merely stating that customary international law exists as U.S. Fed-
eral law even when no controlling executive or legislative act or judi-
cial decision has previously recognized the custom in question.
Alvarez, supra note 163, at 186 n.43 (emphasis in original).  For a historical R
account strongly supporting the second interpretation, see William Dodge,
The Story of the Paquete Habana:  Customary International Law as Part of Our Law,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES (John E. Noyes, Mark Janis, & Laura Dickin-
son eds., 2007).
199. As veteran Boston Globe reporter Charlie Savage points out, “President
Bush has quietly claimed the authority to disobey more than 750 laws en-
acted since he took office, asserting that he has the power to set aside any
statute passed by Congress when it conflicts with his interpretation of the
Constitution.”  Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2006, at A1, available at http://www.boston.com/news/na-
tion/Washington/articles/2006/04/30/bush_challenges_hundreds_of_
laws/.  In fact, the bipartisan American Bar Association Task Force on Presi-
dential Signing Statements and the Separation of Powers Doctrine cautions
that “the Bush Administration has used signing statements to claim the au-
thority or state the intention to disregard or decline to enforce all or part of
a law he signed more than all of his predecessors combined.” AMERICAN BAR
ASS’N, TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARA-
TION OF POWERS DOCTRINE,  RECOMMENDATION  6 (2006), available at http://
www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements/aba_final_signing_statements_rec-
ommendation-report_7-24-06.pdf.  The Task Force also noted that the issue
has deep historical roots, with Parliament condemning King James II for
non-enforcement of certain laws as early as the 17th century. Id. at 19; see
also Christopher S. Kelley, A Comparative Look at the Constitutional Signing
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ments have been issued in the context of the War on Ter-
ror.200 This subsection focuses specifically on a prominent ex-
ample, that is, the signing statement Bush issued for the De-
tainee Treatment Act,201 legislation regulating the treatment
of detainees.
I argue that the Bush Administration has used signing
statements as another vehicle to shift power from the legisla-
tive to the executive branch in ways that deeply undermine
democracy and the democratic incorporation of international
law.202  As with the torture memos, these signing statements
reflect a thin majoritarian conception of democracy that works
against greater democracy in international law rather than for
it.
i. Signing Statement for the Detainee Treatment Act
The signing statement President Bush issued upon sign-
ing the Detainee Treatment Act reflects the ways in which this
practice undermines Congressional efforts to deepen the dem-
ocratic basis of international law.  The Detainee Treatment
Act, enacted as part of the Defense Authorization Act, includes
two important provisions.  First, the part of the legislation
popularly known as the McCain Amendment categorically pro-
Statement:  The Case of Bush and Clinton, at 19 (presented at the 61st An-
nual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association) (April 3-6, 2003),
available at http://mpsa.indiana.edu/conf2003papers/1031858822.pdf.
200. Savage provides that the details of many signing statements, includ-
ing several that have been issued in the context of the War on Terror.  Sav-
age, supra note 199, at A1. R
201. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680,
2739-44 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000dd-2000dd-1) (2006).
202. As Savage notes, President Bush “agrees to a compromise with mem-
bers of Congress, and all of them are there for a public bill-signing cere-
mony, but then he takes back those compromises—and more often than
not, without the Congress or the press or the public knowing what has hap-
pened.”  Savage, supra note 199, at A2.  Savage reports that: R
In his signing statements, Bush has repeatedly asserted that the
Constitution gives him the right to ignore numerous sections of the
bills—sometimes including provisions that were the subject of ne-
gotiations with Congress in order to get lawmakers to pass the bill.
He has appended such statements to more than one of every 10
bills he has signed.
Id.; see also NEIL KINKOPF, AM. CONST. SOC’Y, ISSUE BRIEF, SIGNING STATEMENTS
AND THE PRESIDENT’S AUTHORITY TO REFUSE TO ENFORCE THE LAW 2 (2006),
available at http://www.acslaw.org/node/2965.
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hibits cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of detainees by
all U.S. personnel anywhere in the world.203  Second, the part
of the legislation popularly known as the Graham-Levin
amendment strips habeas jurisdiction for detainees, though
the legislative history is unclear on whether this provision was
intended to apply retroactively.204
By clarifying that even detainees in U.S. custody overseas
are entitled to be free not only of torture, but also of other
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, the McCain Amend-
ment was intended to close a loophole in U.S. implementation
of the Torture Convention.  The Convention prohibits torture
as well as cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punish-
ment.205  However, while the Torture Convention explicitly re-
quires states party to criminalize torture by government offi-
cials occurring anywhere in the world, including extraterritori-
ally, it does not include an explicit obligation to criminalize
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment occurring extrater-
ritorially.  Even though several international bodies take the
view that international human rights obligations apply extra-
territorially as long as the conduct is subject to the contacting
party’s jurisdiction or control,206 the U.S. government has fre-
quently taken the position that its international law obligations
do not apply “beyond the water’s edge,” other than in a few
203. Pub. L. No. 109-148, tit. X, § 1003, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739-40.  The Mc-
Cain Amendment was, of course, sponsored by Senator John McCain, a for-
mer POW in Vietnam.
204. See Pub. L. No. 109-148, tit. X, § 1005, 119 Stat. 2680, 2740-44.  In
Hamdan, the Court found that the habeas-stripping provisions of the De-
tainee Treatment Act did not apply retroactively to Hamdan’s case, which
was pending before the legislation went into effect.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
126 S. Ct. 2749, 2769 (2006).
205. Convention Against Torture, supra note 149, pmbl., art. 2. R
206. See Committee Against Torture, supra note 51, ¶ 15 (noting that “a num- R
ber of the Convention’s provisions are expressed as applying to ‘territory
under the State party’s jurisdiction’” including article 16’s prohibition on
cruel, inhuman, or to degrading treatment or punishment) (citations omit-
ted); cf. Report of the Human Rights Committee, GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp.
No. 40, at 150-58, U.N. Doc. A/46/40 (1991) (stating that Iraq had a clear
responsibility under international law for the observance of human rights
during its occupation of Kuwait); Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) (1995) (stating the same with regard to the European Convention on
Human Rights in case involving the area of Cyprus under Turkish occupa-
tion).
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exceptional cases, such as with the torture prohibition.207  This
was an underlying assumption in the Bybee Opinion, which
tried to limit torture to the worst forms of conduct; since, ac-
cording to the government’s position, only the prohibition on
torture applies overseas, it was important to then limit the scope
of that prohibition.
The McCain Amendment was included as part of the De-
tainee Treatment Act in response to allegations of abuse of
detainees held overseas, including in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
Guantanamo.  Some of the abuses that occurred in the Abu
Ghraib and other detention centers might not have consti-
tuted torture, particularly the high threshold for torture ad-
vanced by the Bybee Opinion, but were nonetheless cruel, in-
human, or degrading treatment or punishment within the
meaning of the Torture Convention.  Since the reasoning in
the Bybee Opinion sought to immunize from criminal prose-
cution coercive techniques falling short of torture (including
conduct that was merely cruel, inhuman, or degrading treat-
ment), the McCain Amendment in particular was seen as a
challenge to the Administration’s “enhanced interrogation”
program.
Therefore, while signing the Act, the President issued a
signing statement including the following buried reference to
McCain’s handiwork in the eighth paragraph:
The executive branch shall construe Title X in Divi-
sion A of the Act, relating to detainees, in a manner
consistent with the constitutional authority of the
President to supervise the unitary executive branch
and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the
constitutional limitations on the judicial power,
which will assist in achieving the shared objective of
the Congress and the President, evidenced in Title X,
207. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctr. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 175-76 (1993)
(accepting the government’s argument that extraterritorial application of
the Refugee Convention to the forced return of Haitian refugees by U.S.
Coast Guard cutters outside of United States borders on the high seas would
be inappropriate and would negate the very purpose of terms such as “de-
portation” and “return”); United States v. Duarte-Acero, 296 F.3d 1277, 1283
(11th Cir. 2002) (relying on the executive branch’s argument that the
ICCPR does not regulate the extraterritorial conduct of U.S. government
agents).
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of protecting the American people from further ter-
rorist attacks.208
Essentially, through the signing statement, “the President
signaled his intention to reserve his authority, as Commander-
in-Chief, to ignore statutory mandates.”209  Martin Lederman
translates this to mean:  “I reserve the constitutional right to
waterboard when it will ‘assist’ in protecting the American
people from terrorist attacks.”210  Or, as Matthew Franck at the
National Review puts it:  “[T]he signing statement . . . conveys
the good news that the president is not taking the McCain
amendment lying down.”211  In rebuffing Congressional au-
thority to regulate the executive branch’s treatment of detain-
ees, the signing statement asserts the thin majoritarian ap-
proach to democracy.
In resisting judicial oversight, other aspects of the signing
statement further reflect the thin majoritarian conception.
For example, the signing statement goes on to say that the leg-
islation creates no private right of action.212  As regards the
Graham-Levin Amendment, the signing statement says that
the jurisdiction-stripping “shall apply to past, present, and fu-
ture actions, including applications for writs of habeas corpus”
and “does not confer any constitutional right upon an alien
detained abroad as an enemy combatant.”213  A constitutional
conception of democracy, on the other hand, would keep the
courthouse doors open to noncitizen detainees and would em-
brace a private right of action as democracy-enhancing.
Responding in particular to the signing statement’s resis-
tance to Congressional regulation of the treatment of detain-
ees—signaled in its reference to the “constitutional authority
of the President to supervise the unitary executive
branch”214—the Bill’s three principal Senate sponsors, Repub-
208. President’s Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N.
S50, S51 (Dec. 30, 2005).
209. Posting of Martin Lederman, So Much for the President’s Assent to
the McCain Amendment, to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2006/01/so-much-for-presidents-assent-to.html (Jan. 2, 2006).
210. Id.
211. Id. (quoting Franck).
212. President’s Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, supra note 208, at R
S51.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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licans John McCain of Arizona, John W. Warner of Virginia,
and Lindsey O. Graham of South Carolina, all publicly re-
buked the President’s contention that he could disobey the
torture ban.  Graham noted:  “I do not believe that any politi-
cal figure in the country has the ability to set aside any . . . law
of armed conflict that we have adopted or treaties that we have
ratified.”215  The President’s signing statement thus neatly re-
flects the contradictions at issue in this Article:  insisting on
less democratic process in an area where enforcing interna-
tional law would be democracy-enhancing rather than democ-
racy-diminishing.
3. The Judicial Response: Hamdan as a Democracy-(Rein)forcing
Decision
The Hamdan Court rejected the claim that the War on
Terror justifies executive unilateralism and the flouting of
Congressional limits.  In rejecting broad claims of executive
unilateralism, Hamdan calls on the President to consult Con-
gress as a true partner in developing standards governing war-
time detainees.  In this sense, Hamdan is a democracy-
(rein)forcing decision.216  It reflects a thicker majoritarian
perspective on democracy than the Administration has been
prepared to accept and leaves the door open to the constitu-
tional conception of democracy outlined in Part III.
While the Hamdan decision concerns the validity of the
military commission the White House established to try Salim
Ahmed Hamdan, Osama bin Laden’s former driver, the sweep
of the decision is necessarily broader and has multiple implica-
tions for the treatment of detainees.  First, not only does
Hamdan embrace the continuing relevance of the Geneva
Conventions, it also holds that Common Article 3 of the Ge-
neva Conventions applies to the conflict between the United
States and Al Qaeda.217  Second, Hamdan validates the demo-
215. Id.
216. For the reasons described below, I am describing the Hamdan deci-
sion as democracy-reinforcing, as opposed to merely democracy-forcing as
described by Jack Balkin.  Balkin, supra note 8. R
217. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2795-96.  In contrast to Com-
mon Article 2, which only applies to an armed conflict between “two or more
of the High Contracting Parties,” Common Article 3 contains baseline stan-
dards concerning the treatment of those detained in a “conflict not of an
international character.”  Third Geneva Convention, supra note 6, arts. 2, 3. R
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cratic process as vital to determining the relationship between
domestic and international law.  Third, the Hamdan decision
vindicates the separation of powers and rebuffs the President’s
wartime claims of executive unilateralism (pursuant to his
Commander-in-Chief powers) over the treatment of detainees.
On the first point, Hamdan’s holding that Common Arti-
cle 3 applies to the conflict between the United States and Al
Qaeda is significant for the issue of torture.  While the Hamdan
case itself involves the question of whether the military tribu-
nal at issue was a “regularly constituted court” under Common
Article 3,218 other provisions of Common Article 3 prohibit in-
humane treatment,219 “cruel treatment and torture,”220 and
“outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment.”221  Because the Court momentously de-
clared that at least Common Article 3 applies to the conflict
with Al Qaeda as a matter of treaty interpretation, the decision
essentially rejects the claim made by Bush Administration offi-
cials that the standards found in Common Article 3 do not
apply to  the 9/11 detainees.222
With the prevalence of civil wars, conflicts involving nonstate actors, and
other unconventional forms of warfare, conflicts envisioned by Common Ar-
ticle 3 have become much more widespread than the more conventional
forms of warfare envisioned by Common Article 2.
218. Article 3 prohibits “the passing of sentences and the carrying out of
executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly consti-
tuted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples.”  Third Geneva Convention, supra note 6, R
art. 3(1)(d).
219. Id. art. 3(1).
220. Id. art. 3(1)(a).
221. Id. art. 3(1)(c).
222. Writing for the plurality, Justice Stevens rejects the Administration’s
narrow reading of Common Article 3’s scope.  The Administration had ar-
gued that the scope of Common Article 3 was limited to civil wars and that,
in any event, the war on terrorism had an international character. Hamdan,
126 S. Ct. at 2795-96. In contrast, the Court opined that Common Article 3
extends to any conflict not covered under Common Article 2, which applies
to international conflicts (traditionally between two state parties to the Ge-
neva Convention). Id. at 2796.  Therefore, Common Article 3 applies in the
case of “[armed] conflict not of an international character.” Hamdan, 126 S.
Ct. at 2795.  Reversing the D.C. Circuit’s contrary holding on this issue, the
Court embraced the view that Common Article 3 applies baseline, minimum
standards to detainees who are not otherwise eligible for protected status
under the Geneva Convention as, for example, prisoners of war (POWs). Id.
While four other justices joined this part of Stevens’s opinion and three dis-
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A second way in which Hamdan has relevance for the tor-
ture question is in its validation of the democratic process in
negotiating the relationship between domestic and interna-
tional law.  According to the Court, if the President no longer
wants domestic law to track the international protections
found in the Geneva Conventions, he must achieve this out-
come with the support of Congress, renegotiating the relation-
ship between domestic law and the Geneva Conventions by en-
gaging in the democratic process to revise the relevant stat-
utes.223 Hamdan itself addresses the domestic incorporation of
the Geneva Conventions through the UCMJ224 provisions on
military commissions.225  Because the military tribunal in ques-
tion failed to comply with the Common Article 3 requirement
of providing a “regularly constituted court” to try Hamdan, the
Court found that it violated the UCMJ and also, therefore,
sented, Chief Justice John Roberts recused himself from the case because,
prior to his nomination to the Supreme Court, he had been a judge on the
D.C. Circuit panel that had decided the case below.
223. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2773 (“Exigency alone, of course, will not jus-
tify the establishment and use of penal tribunals not contemplated by Article
I, section 8 and Article III, section 1 of the Constitution unless some other
part of that document authorizes a response to the felt need.  And that au-
thority, if it exists, can derive only from the powers granted jointly to the
President and Congress in time of war.” (citations omitted)); id. at 2808
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In sum, as presently structured, Hamdan’s mili-
tary commission exceeds the bounds Congress has placed on the President’s
authority in sections 836 and 821 of the UCMJ.  Because Congress has pre-
scribed these limits, Congress can change them, requiring a new analysis
consistent with the Constitution and other governing laws.  At this time,
however, we must apply the standards Congress has provided.  By those stan-
dards the military commission is deficient.”); id. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concur-
ring) (“The Court’s conclusion ultimately rests upon a single ground:  Con-
gress has not issued the Executive a ‘blank check.’  Indeed, Congress has
denied the President the legislative authority to create military commissions
of the kind at issue here.  Nothing prevents the President from returning to
Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary.” (citations omitted)).
224. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946
(2006).
225. In the military commissions context, Congress had implemented in-
ternational standards through the UCMJ by requiring that military commis-
sions comport with the laws of war.  In other words, Congress limited the
President’s authority by specifying that compliance with the Geneva Conven-
tions is a condition for exercising the authority to establish military commis-
sions.
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Common Article 3.226  Accordingly, if the President wants to
loosen this requirement, he must convince Congress to amend
the UCMJ, although any changes in domestic law would still
need to be consistent with our international legal obliga-
tions.227  Similarly, regarding the prohibition on torture, if the
President does not agree with the Federal Torture Statute, the
War Crimes Act, and the international obligations imple-
mented through these statutes, he must consult with Congress
to override these laws.  Justice Breyer’s concurrence in
Hamdan provides a window into the plurality’s analysis on this
point:
Where, as here, no emergency prevents consultation
with Congress, judicial insistence upon that consulta-
tion does not weaken our Nation’s ability to deal with
danger.  To the contrary, that insistence strengthens
the Nation’s ability to determine—through demo-
cratic means—how best to do so.  The Constitution
places its faith in those democratic means.  Our
Court today simply does the same.228
226. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759 (“[W]e conclude that the military com-
mission convened to try Hamdan lacks power to proceed because its struc-
ture and procedures violate both the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions.”);
id. at 2796 (“Common Article 3, then, is applicable here and, as indicated
above, requires that Hamdan be tried by a ‘regularly constituted court af-
fording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples.’”).
In addition to finding that the military tribunal violated the UCMJ and,
by extension, Common Article 3, the Court also held that the President had
no authority to constitute the military tribunal in the first place. Id. at 2786
(“Whether or not the Government has charged Hamdan with an offense
against the law of war cognizable by military commission, the commission
lacks power to proceed.”).
227. For example, the Third Geneva Convention requires that “High Con-
tracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effec-
tive penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed,
any of the grave breaches of the present Convention” including “willfully
depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed
in this Convention.”  Third Geneva Convention, supra note 6, arts. 129-30; see R
also Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 6, arts. 146-47 (requiring that R
“High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to
provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be
committed, any of the grave breaches of the present Convention,” including
“willfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial
prescribed in the present Convention”).
228. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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A third and related way in which the Hamdan decision is
important for the torture debate is in its vindication of the sep-
aration of powers and its rejection of the President’s wartime
claims of executive unilateralism over the treatment of detain-
ees.  Again, this is reflected perhaps most clearly in Justice
Breyer’s concurrence, in which he writes to highlight the fact
that “[t]he Court’s conclusion ultimately rests upon a single
ground:  Congress has not issued the Executive a ‘blank
check.’”229
In effect, Hamdan laid to rest the Administration’s argu-
ment that international law protections implemented by Con-
gress unconstitutionally interfere with the President’s power as
Commander-in-Chief.230  It therefore fundamentally influ-
ences the contours of the debate on separation of powers, the
requirements of democracy, international law, and the War on
Terror.  Given this, scholars note that we have not seen such a
persuasive or historic vindication of Congressional law over ex-
ecutive power since Youngstown,231 and that Hamdan may even
be “the most important decision on Presidential power
ever.”232
The various opinions in the Hamdan decision can be seen
as wrestling with the challenge of figuring out where the Presi-
dent’s policies relating to the treatment of detainees fit within
the three-part framework outlined in Justice Jackson’s Youngs-
town concurrence, and, relatedly, the extent to which the Pres-
ident was required to seek democratic approval of his policies
229. Id. (quoting Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in Hamdi v. Rum-
sfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)).  In addition to requiring under UCMJ article 21
that military commissions comport with the laws of war, Congress had also
required under UCMJ article 36 that the rules for military commissions be
the same, “so far as [the President] considers practicable,” as those “in the
trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts.” See UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. §§ 821, 836 (2006).
230. The Court also spurned the Administration’s arguments that the
Court had no jurisdiction over the case under the jurisdiction-stripping pro-
visions of the Detainment Treatment Act or under comity considerations
that would have favored abstention. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2769-71.
231. Flaherty, More Real than Apparent, supra note 3, at 1, 51 (citing Youngs- R
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)).
232. Walter Dellinger, A Supreme Court Conversation, SLATE, June 29, 2006,
http://www.slate.com/id/2144476/entry/2144825.
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through Congress.233  The plurality in Hamdan, per Justice Ste-
vens, sees the case as fitting squarely within Justice Jackson’s
third category,234 where the President takes measures inconsis-
tent with the democratic will of Congress and, thus, his author-
ity is at its lowest ebb.  After all, Congress expressly provided in
the UCMJ that military commissions comport with the laws of
war and that the rules for the commissions be the same, to the
extent “practicable,” as those for courts martial.  In dissent,
however, Justice Clarence Thomas argues that because Con-
gress had previously authorized the President “to use all neces-
sary and appropriate force” against suspected terrorists in pass-
ing the Authorization for Use of Military Force, Congress had
in effect granted the President discretion to establish military
commissions as an incident of war.235  Therefore, Justice
Thomas views the case as fitting within Justice Jackson’s first
category,236 where executive authority—exercised pursuant to
congressional authorization—is at its zenith.
Where the plurality and dissent find agreement is in af-
firming the continuing vitality of the Youngstown framework,
which, by acknowledging a role for Congress, disfavors the
thin majoritarian approach to democracy.237  By requiring the
233. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).  Recall that
Justice Jackson opined, first, that “[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an
express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maxi-
mum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Con-
gress can delegate.” Id. at 635.  Second, “[w]hen the President acts in ab-
sence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely
upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which
he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution
is uncertain.” Id. at 637.  And third, “[w]hen the President takes measures
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at
its lowest ebb.” Id.
234. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774 n.23.
235. Id. at 2824 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting from the Authorization
for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (codi-
fied in note following 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2000, Supp. III)) (emphasis added),
and noting also that Congress implicitly authorized the President to estab-
lish military commissions in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000dd–2000dd-1 (2006))).
236. See id. (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635).
237. Interestingly, a recent study of restrictions on civil liberties during
times of war reflects that even before Youngstown, the Court was more likely
to uphold executive authority where there had been bicameral endorsement
through Congressional approval. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H.
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President to go through the democratic process if he wants to
depart, in the course of the War on Terror, from legislation
implementing international law, Hamdan and the Youngstown
framework demonstrate that “[w]hen the President takes mea-
sures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Con-
gress, his power is at its lowest ebb.”238
Importantly, in finding the President constrained by legis-
lation deepening the democratic basis of international law,
“[w]hat the [Hamdan] Court has done is not so much counter-
majoritarian as democracy forcing.  It has limited the President
by forcing him to go back to Congress to ask for more author-
ity than he already has . . . .”239  Beyond forcing democracy by
requiring the President to return to Congress to ask for addi-
tional authority, the Hamdan decision also reinforces democ-
racy by reaffirming past Congressional action and by validating
the democratic basis of international law that has already been
implemented through these Congressional efforts.  The Court
in Hamdan thus embraces a thicker majoritarian perspective
on democracy than that advanced by the Bush Administration,
leaving the door ajar to a broader constitutional conception of
democracy.
V. REINFORCING DEMOCRACY IN THE AFTERMATH OF HAMDAN:
TORTURE AND THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT
According to conventional wisdom, democratic considera-
tion of international law will not always favor the adoption of
the international legal norms at issue, particularly in the areas
of human rights and humanitarian law, where counter-
majoritarian values are implicated.  The intuition, then, is to
assume that democratic deliberation—especially in the narrow
majoritarian or electoral sense of democratic deliberation—
will not favor adoption of international law standards that pro-
tect minorities or otherwise shift power away from the major-
ity’s status quo.  As I develop further in this Part of my Article,
Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism:  An Institutional
Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 1
(2004) (surveying the Court’s response to restrictions on civil liberties dur-
ing times of conflict, including in the Civil War, World War II, the Korean
War, and the Iranian hostage crisis).
238. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637.
239. Posting of Jack Balkin, supra note 8. R
\\server05\productn\N\NYI\40-3\NYI302.txt unknown Seq: 70 28-MAY-08 11:20
792 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 40:723
the torture debate indicates that while a purely electoral ap-
proach to the question of torture places such standards in
jeopardy, a richer understanding of democracy would help se-
cure them.
Responding to the challenge posed by critics on their own
terms, this Part asks what happens if we allow for broader
forms of democratic deliberation not masked in terms of presi-
dential power over an international norm such as the torture
prohibition.  Section A explores one form of deliberation:
Congressional consideration of legislation, such as the Military
Commissions Act, through which Congress maintained torture
as a war crime but eliminated judicial remedies for detainees
to challenge torture and other abusive conduct.  Section B ex-
plores another form of deliberation:  courts, which provide ad-
ditional avenues for democratic deliberation.
As this Part of the Article describes in further detail, by
restricting court access for detainees, the Military Commis-
sions Act cuts off the democratic function of courts and there-
fore falls far short of the constitutional conception of democ-
racy advanced here.  A constitutional conception of democ-
racy would maintain judicial remedies either as a means to
ensure equal treatment of citizens and noncitizens or as a
means to ensure substantive rights—such as the torture prohi-
bition—essential to maintaining human dignity.
A. Torture and the Majoritarian Conception of Democracy
1. Torture and the Military Commissions Act
Reflecting the majoritarian conception of democracy, the
Military Commissions Act fails to recognize the important
democratic function of the judiciary and thus does not meet
the requirements of the constitutional conception of democ-
racy outlined in Part III.  After weeks of political stalemate,
Congress passed the MCA and the President signed it into law
on October 17, 2006.  Two aspects of the MCA are particularly
important for the issue of torture.  One is the impact of the
legislation on the substantive law of torture.  The other is its
impact on the structure of judicial and other remedies availa-
ble to challenge violations of the prohibition on torture.
In terms of the substance, the White House had originally
proposed a bill that would have redefined U.S. obligations
under the Geneva Conventions and the 1996 War Crimes Act
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implementing the Geneva Conventions.  The proposed bill
would have allowed abusive interrogation of detainees to con-
tinue.  Congress refused.  Largely because of the leadership of
three Republicans–—Senators John McCain, Lindsay Graham,
and John Warner—the compromise legislation that ultimately
emerged maintained both torture and cruel and inhuman
treatment as war crimes (as had the original War Crimes
Act).240  Thus, anyone engaging in—or authorizing—this pro-
hibited conduct is subject to prosecution as a war criminal.
The remedial structure of the statute, however, is deeply
troubling.  Of greatest concern is the fact that the statute strips
habeas jurisdiction from federal courts over challenges
brought by detainees.241  This deeply undermines the constitu-
tional conception of democracy advanced in this Article.  An-
other disturbing aspect of the statute’s remedial structure is
that while the legislation does not modify the substantive law
of torture, it redefines the category of war crimes that can be
criminally prosecuted under the War Crimes Act.  Specifically,
the MCA amends the War Crimes Act so that only grave
breaches of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions can
be prosecuted as war crimes.242  By decriminalizing other vio-
lations of Common Article 3, the legislation suggests that so-
called “non-grave” breaches are not worthy of prosecutorial re-
sources.  This includes “outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular humiliating and degrading treatment.”243  In other
words, this includes the abusive conduct falling just short of
torture that the detainees at the Abu Ghraib facility exper-
ienced at the hands of U.S. guards.
240. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6, 120 Stat.
2600, 2632-35.  For the original version of the War Crimes Act, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 2441(c)(3) (1997) (current version at id. (2006)).
241. Military Commissions Act, § 7, 120 Stat. at 2635-36.  The legality of
this aspect of the legislation is an issue currently before the Supreme Court.
Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 994 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (upholding habeas-
stripping provisions of the MCA), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007); see also
Hamdan v.  Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D.D.C. 2006) (on remand)
(upholding habeas stripping provisions of the MCA).
242. See Military Commissions Act, § 6(b), 120 Stat. at 2633-35. Compare
War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(3) (1997) (defining as a war crime any
conduct “which constitutes a violation of common Article 3”), with 18 U.S.C.
§ 2441(c)(3) (2006) (lacking that provision).
243. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 6, art. 3(1)(c). R
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By focusing obsessively on the degree or severity of the
abuse, the legislation sends the message that it is only the de-
gree of suffering imposed that is important, as opposed to the
horrible and political nature of the act.244  In other words, the
legislation focuses our attention on the degree, not the kind of
act in question.245  As Abu Ghraib made clear, even abuse fall-
ing short of what the current Administration deems to consti-
tute torture can still be humiliating and degrading treatment
that violates the human dignity and bodily integrity of individ-
uals in such a fundamentally cruel and subordinating way as to
place human beings “outside the ambit of being human.”246  It
is therefore not only a physical act but also a profoundly politi-
cal one.247  Whether the abuse involves technical torture or
other forms of humiliating and degrading treatment, state in-
fliction of this kind of abuse marks those targeted as less than
human.248  By focusing on degree rather than the kind of act
in question, the Military Commissions Act normalizes the kind
of conduct that occurred in Abu Ghraib.  What is particularly
disturbing, then—both in the torture memos preceding
Hamdan and in the Military Commissions Act that followed
it—is that “far from operating extralegally,” abusive interroga-
tion of detainees “has been painstakingly defined,”249 albeit
under the cover of secret memos and signing statements is-
244. Dorothy Roberts, Noreen E. McNamara Lecture, Fordham Law
School:  Race and Politics of Torture (Mar. 1, 2007).
245. Id.  Referring to the abuse of detainees in Abu Ghraib, Roberts notes:
“The degree doesn’t matter; it’s the kind of thing you’re doing to them.”
246. Id. (tracing the political nature of torture to race, slavery, and subor-
dination from the public torture of slaves and prostitutes in ancient Greece
through colonialism, lynching in the American South, police brutality, and
Abu Ghraib).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.  As Jose Alvarez says of the torture memos:
This is not torture outside the law but, ostensibly, under it.  Gradu-
ates of Harvard or Yale Law Schools and former clerks of the U.S.
Supreme Court usually do not themselves strap people down on
the water boards, attach electric wires to their appendages, hand-
cuff them in “stress” positions that cause them to suffocate, with-
hold vital medical treatment, or threaten naked detainees with at-
tack dogs.  Their positions in society give them the luxury to write
legal memoranda that authorize or permit other people to do these
things.
Alvarez, supra note 163, at 177. R
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sued without much fanfare.  While the White House claimed
that the “outrages upon personal dignity” language was vague
and that it needed to get rid of criminal penalties for this
crime in order to “clarify” the law,250 the impact of, and per-
haps the intent behind, the legislation was actually to mask
and obscure the Administration’s objections to the substantive
law of torture.
The bottom line is that while the substantive right to be
free from torture is preserved in the MCA, the law strips
habeas access to courts and limits the category of crimes that
can be prosecuted under the War Crimes Act.  Moreover, the
executive branch controls the decision over whether to prose-
cute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions as war crimes
and whether to promulgate regulations for other (“non-
grave”) violations.251  Additionally, detainees are restricted to
bringing appeals in the D.C. Circuit and only in order to re-
view final determinations of the Combatant Status Review
Tribunals or military commissions.252  The question of reme-
dies (or lack thereof) is of course critical to truly defending
the substantive rights at stake.253  At this writing, efforts are
250. See, e.g., Legislation in Response to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Armed Services , 109th Cong. 8, 10 (2006) (statement of Alberto
Gonzales, Att’y Gen. of the United States); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld:  Establishing
a Constitutional Process:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. (2006) (statement of Steve Bradbury, Ass’t Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Office of Legal Counsel).
251. Under the legislation, the “President has the authority to interpret
the meaning and application of the Geneva Conventions and to promulgate
higher standards and administrative regulations for violations of treaty obli-
gations which are not grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.”  Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6(a)(3), 120 Stat. 2600,
2632 (emphasis added).  The President is to issue such interpretations by
Executive Order published in the Federal Register. Id.
252. See id. at 2622.
253. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“The gov-
ernment of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of
laws, and not of men.  It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation,
if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”).  Mar-
shall also quoted Blackstone’s better-known formulation that “it is a general
and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal
remedy, by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded.” Id. (quot-
ing William Blackstone, 3 COMMENTARIES *23); see also John C. Jeffrey, Jr.,
The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87 (1999); David
Rudovsky, Running in Place:  The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted
Remedies, 2005 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 1202 (2005).
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underway in Congress to repeal the habeas stripping provi-
sions of the legislation. But as it stands, the MCA is inconsis-
tent with the constitutional conception of democracy in its fail-
ure to recognize the important democratic function of court
access for the politically unrepresented detainees.
2. Torture and Public Opinion
As further evidence that the majoritarian, electoral ap-
proach to democracy does not adequately safeguard funda-
mental rights and protect noncitizens, consider the surveys
conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2005.  These surveys
indicate that the American public was more open than opin-
ion leaders to abandoning the substantive prohibition on tor-
ture.254
254. THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER, BEYOND RED VS. BLUE:  REPUBLICANS DI-
VIDED ABOUT ROLE OF GOVERNMENT—DEMOCRATS BY SOCIAL AND PERSONAL
VALUES 49-50 (2005), available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/
242.pdf (“Overall, the public is divided over using torture against suspected
terrorists when such tactics may yield important information.  Roughly half
(51%) of people surveyed said torture was never or rarely justified, but 45%
believed it was at least sometimes justified.”); THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER,
AMERICA’S PLACE IN THE WORLD 2005:  AN INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTITUDES
OF AMERICAN OPINION LEADERS AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC ABOUT INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS 24 (2005), available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/
263.pdf [hereinafter PEW, AMERICA’S PLACE IN THE WORLD 2005] (“The
American public is far more open than opinion leaders to the use of torture
against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information.  Nearly
half the public (46%) says this can either [ ] often (15%) or sometimes
(31%) be justified.”).  I would like to thank David Luban for bringing these
survey results to my attention.
Such results may turn, in part, on how the question was framed and
presented.  The question posed to those taking the survey was:  “Do you
think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain impor-
tant information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be jus-
tified, or never be justified?” PEW, AMERICA’S PLACE IN THE WORLD 2005,
supra, at 73 (Q.33 of the survey).
Note that the underlying assumption that torture yields reliable infor-
mation was never questioned in the Pew Survey.  By contrast, in discussing
his experience of being tortured as a prisoner of war during the Vietnam
War, John McCain has explained how he revealed false information just to
get the torture to stop:
Obviously, to defeat our enemies we need intelligence, but intelli-
gence that is reliable.  We should not torture or treat inhumanely
terrorists we have captured.  The abuse of prisoners harms, not
helps, our war effort.  In my experience, abuse of prisoners often
produces bad intelligence because under torture a person will say
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thing anything he thinks his captors want to hear—whether it is
true or false—if he believes it will relieve his suffering.  I was once
physically coerced to provide my enemies with the names of the
members of my flight squadron. . . .  Instead, I gave them the
names of the Green Bay Packers’ offensive line, knowing that pro-
viding them false information was sufficient to suspend the abuse.
It seems probable to me that the terrorists we interrogate under
less than humane standards of treatment are also likely to resort to
deceptive answers that are perhaps less provably false than that
which I once offered.
John McCain, Torture’s Terrible Toll, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 21, 2005, at 34, available
at http://www.newsweek.com/id/51200.  McCain also tries to address the
concern that application of the Geneva Conventions places limits on ques-
tioning of POWs by noting that when he was a POW, “I did not refuse (ques-
tioning), or repeat my insistence that I was required under the Geneva Con-
ventions to provide my captors only with my name, rank and serial number.”
Id.  Instead, he gave his captors false information to put an end to the abuse
he received.
Likewise, on the same day in October 2006 that the President admitted
to the existence of secret prisons, the senior intelligence officer in the U.S.
Army, General Jeff Kimmons, told a Pentagon briefing:
No good intelligence is going to come from abusive practices.  I
think history tells us that.  I think the empirical evidence of the last
five years, hard years, tell us that.
Moreover, any piece of intelligence which is obtained under du-
ress, through the use of abusive techniques, would be of questiona-
ble credibility, and additionally it would do more harm than good
when it inevitably became known that abusive practices were used.
And we can’t afford to go there.
Some of our most significant successes on the battlefield have
been—in fact, I would say all of them, almost categorically all of
them, have accrued from expert interrogators using mixtures of au-
thorized humane interrogation practices in clever ways. . . .  We
don’t need abusive practices in there.  Nothing good will come
from them.
Lt. Gen. Jeff Kimmons, Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Def.
Dep’t News Briefing on Detainee Policy (Sept. 6, 2006), available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/06/AR200609
0601442.html.
At the same briefing, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defuse for Detainee
Affairs Cully Stimson added:
[W]hen I spend time in Guantanamo talking to the interrogators
there, they’ll tell you that the intelligence they get from detainees is
best derived through a period of rapport-building, long-term rap-
port-building; an interrogation plan that is proper, vetted, worked
through all the channels that General Kimmons is talking about,
and then building rapport with that particular detainee.
So it’s not like [a] TV show where they take them in the back room.
You’re not going to get trustworthy information, as I under [sic] it,
\\server05\productn\N\NYI\40-3\NYI302.txt unknown Seq: 76 28-MAY-08 11:20
798 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 40:723
The fact that Congress chose not to abandon the substan-
tive prohibition on torture in the MCA bears out the Pew Sur-
vey findings that opinion leaders were less inclined than the
general public to breach U.S. treaty commitments banning
torture.  But the question remains whether a majoritarian con-
ception of democracy—even a thick majoritarian perspective
allowing Congress to check the President—is a sufficiently ro-
bust view of democracy if it puts the question of a fundamental
right such the right to be free from torture up for a vote and
permits restrictions on judicial relief.
B. Torture and the Constitutional Conception of Democracy
The question of whether to leave questions of fundamen-
tal rights to the electorate is particularly stark for those who
agree, as I do, with Jeremy Waldron’s assessment that the pro-
hibition on torture “is not just one rule among others, but is a
legal archetype—a provision which is emblematic of our larger
commitment to nonbrutality in the legal system.”255  As a legal
archetype, the rule against torture “has significance not just in
from detainees. It’s through a methodical, comprehensive, vetted,
legal and now transparent, in terms of techniques, set of laydown
that allows the interrogator to get the type of information that they
need.
Cully Stimson, Deputy Ass’t Sec’y of Def. for Detainee Affairs, News Briefing
on Detainee Policy (Sept. 6, 2006), available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/06/AR2006090601442.html.
Similarly, Rear Admiral (ret.) John Hutson, former Judge Advocate
General for the Navy, points out:
All the literature, all the experts say that torture doesn’t work as a
technique to get good, valuable intelligence. . . .   People don’t like
to hear it, but the best way to get information is to befriend them,
to break down the barriers.  You want them to forget that you are
enemies.  You tend to their wounds, you see how they are, and then
they start to talk.
But when you do just the opposite and remind them in the most
brutal ways that you are on opposite sides, they resist.  The litera-
ture says that people can resist for a couple of days, but then every-
body talks, just to make you stop the pain. But there is no reliability
to what they’re saying. They are only talking to get you to stop the
torture.
Rear Admiral (Ret.) John Hutson, Ending Torture and Secret Detention in
America’s Name (May 12, 2005), available at http://www.cceia.org/re-
sources/transcripts/5165.html; see also O’Connell, supra note 42, at 1264 R
(quoting experienced interrogators).
255. Waldron, supra note 13, at 1681. R
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and of itself, but also as the embodiment of a pervasive princi-
ple.”256  In other words, this norm does double-duty:  It not
only does its own normative work, but it also holds up the nor-
mative weight of other, related norms, such as the prohibition
of cruel and unusual punishment, the requirement of due pro-
cess, and the privilege against self-incrimination.257
A rule performing such important normative work and so
fundamental to human dignity as the torture prohibition
should not be open for debate through the electoral system,
subject as it is to the whims and tyranny of the majority.  Fun-
damental rights and the role of courts in vindicating these
rights must be preserved.  Court access to vindicate such basic
rights performs an important democratic function of its own
by offering individuals—particularly minorities and other out-
siders—a critical means through which they can participate in
and correct government decisionmaking.  For these reasons
and those discussed in Part III, a constitutional conception is
preferable to a majoritarian conception of democracy.
VI. CONCLUSION
My objective in this Article is to reclaim democracy rather
than allow critics of international law to monopolize it.  I have
juxtaposed the positions taken by these critics in the context of
constitutional analysis on the one hand, and the War on Ter-
ror on the other, to demonstrate that these two positions re-
flect different strands of democracy theory—thick and thin
majoritarian approaches, respectively.  Additionally, I have
sought to show that the claims made are wrong in both ac-
counts.  One may reasonably ask whether the opposite is also
true.  In other words, is there a tension between arguing, as I
have done, that courts need not require additional democratic
review of binding international law such as ratified treaties and
customary international law before resorting to it in constitu-
tional interpretation, while the President must seek additional
democratic process in the War on Terror if he wants to depart
from international obligations implemented through legisla-
tion?
256. Id. at 1687.
257. Id. at 1730-34.
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The answer is no.  On the one hand, in justifying resort to
international law for constitutional interpretation, I have
shown that binding international law (i.e. ratified treaties and
customary international law) does not actually suffer from the
democratic deficits that critics claim.  While I have noted else-
where that additional democratic review of ratified treaties
and customary international law could be useful under partic-
ular circumstances, it is not required as a matter of law.258  On
the other hand, Hamdan and Youngstown require the President
to seek additional democratic process and the consent of Con-
gress if he wants to depart from legislation that implements in-
ternational law in the course of the War on Terror.  By af-
firming the role of all three branches in negotiating the rela-
tionship between domestic and international law, the positions
I have taken in Parts IV.A and B are consistent because they
consistently advance a thick constitutional conception of de-
mocracy.
While the critics’ analysis of international law is flawed in
both accounts, their views help highlight the value of demo-
cratic deliberation as a mechanism for negotiating the rela-
tionship between internationalism and constitutionalism.
While democratic deliberation is merely one vehicle for influ-
encing states to comply with international law,259 it is nonethe-
less an important and oft-overlooked one.260  Ultimately, there
are multiple ports of entry for internalization of international
law that scholars should closely examine.261
258. See, e.g., Powell, Dialogic Federalism, supra note 23, at 251-52. R
259. Other avenues for influencing state behavior include a variety of
mechanisms involving legal enforcement and collateral consequences (as re-
sponses to non-compliance) which operate both domestically and transna-
tionally.  For a discussion of these mechanisms, see Oona Hathaway, Between
Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV.
469, 497-511 (2005).  Hathaway discusses these mechanisms within a broader
overview of theories that explain why states comply with international law.
Id. For other helpful overviews of compliance theory, see generally Koh,
Transnational Legal Process, supra note 100; Goodman & Jinks, How to Influence R
States, supra note 36. R
260. On this point, see also my earlier work in Powell, Dialogic Federalism,
supra note 23, at 255-62; Powell, Lifting the Veil, supra note 23, at 363-83; Cath- R
erine Powell, The Role of Transnational Norm Entrepreneurs in the U.S. “War on
Terrorism,” 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 47, 50-51 (2004).
261. See generally Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration:  American Exceptionalism,
Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564
(2006).
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Certainly one function of international law is to mediate
between a state’s interest in its own sovereignty and the sover-
eignty interests of other states—including those states’ citizens
living or detained abroad.  Such interactions with other states
often re-create a state’s conception of its own interests.  It is no
coincidence, then, that early developments in the field of in-
ternational human rights law were geared toward protecting
linguistic, national, and ethnic minorities as well as foreign na-
tionals living abroad.262
A constitutional conception of democracy should be ap-
plied to fundamental rights issues such as the question of tor-
ture and to the treatment of minorities and other outsiders.263
The constitutional conception offers two possible alternatives
described by this Article.
Reluctant to “freeze a particular substantive conception of
law and to place,” a thin constitutional conception of democ-
racy merely insists on judicial oversight where the political
branches have failed to respect equal treatment between citi-
zens and noncitizens.264  By bootstrapping the rights of nonci-
tizens to citizens in this way, noncitizens would be “‘virtually’
represented by citizens and the political process.”265  Instead
of focusing on the proper substantive standards to be ap-
plied—for example, whether torture should be allowed in the
interrogation of terrorism suspects—this approach instead fo-
cuses on the decisionmaking process to ensure “that the inter-
est of those that do not have a voice in the legislature are effec-
tively represented by those that do.”266  On this view, if the
same rule applies to citizens and noncitizens, it is unlikely that
citizens would vote for torture.
By contrast, the thick constitutional conception of democ-
racy which this Article embraces takes a more substantive ap-
proach and is premised on the view that judicial intervention
is warranted to remedy violations of fundamental rights above
and beyond the basic right to equality.  A thick constitutional
conception sees preservation of fundamental rights inherent
262. See HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 98, at 276-78. R
263. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4
(1938).
264. Katyal, supra note 8, at 1365-66. R
265. Id. at 1369.
266. Id. at 1382.
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in human dignity as a democratic condition that ensures basic
forms of individual autonomy, personal liberty, and bodily in-
tegrity as necessary for the functioning of true democracy.  On
this view, certain rights are so inherent in human dignity that
they may not be taken away through the political process.  The
concept of jus cogens in international law reflects this view.  A
jus cogens norm such as the prohibition on torture is a peremp-
tory norm that can only be replaced by another norm of com-
parable character.  Since such norms cannot be undone by do-
mestic legislation, they are countermajoritarian, but may be
justified and protected from the political process on grounds
that they entrench rights essential to preserving basic human
dignity.  Moreover, jus cogens norms are themselves democracy-
enhancing in that they help minorities guard against
majoritarian oppression.  Adapting John Hart Ely’s famous de-
fense of judicial protection of minorities to the international
law context, we can view jus cogens as “resources with which
minorities [and vulnerable individuals] can protect themselves
from majoritarian oppression.”267
Under either the thin or the thick constitutional concep-
tion of democracy, detainees would have court access and the
political branches would be more accountable to noncitizen
detainees in exercising power over them.  As this Article goes
to press, a new round of previously secret legal memos by Jus-
tice Department lawyers has come to light.268  Further, Attor-
ney General Michael Mukasey has testified during his confir-
mation hearings that the President’s authority as Commander-
in-Chief may allow him to ignore laws written by Congress.269
The exercise of such unbridled power over detainees who have
no voice in a political process that has removed judicial reme-
dies to vindicate basic rights is very much at odds with any con-
ception of democracy worth its salt.
267. Chander, supra note 19, at 1203 (adapting Ely). R
268. See, e.g., Scott Shane, David Johnston & James Risen, Secret U.S. Endorse-
ment of Severe Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2007, at A1, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/10/04/washington/04interrogate.html (detailing
abusive tactics authorized in secret Justice Department memos); Mazzetti,
supra note 160, at A1 (relating the discovery of a new memo and its con- R
tents).
269. For example, in the context of warrantless wiretapping, Mukasey tes-
tified:  “The President is not putting someone above the law; the president is
putting somebody within the law.”  Shenon, supra note 38. R
